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Combating Judicial Misconduct: 
A Stoic Approach 
MICHAEL D. CICCHINI† 
 
I like and respect some judges, but not as many as I should. Too 
many are mean-spirited and arrogant, going out of their way to 
insult, ridicule, and demean those who come before them. 
 




A vast variety of missiles are launched with us as their target. 
 
If you want a man to keep his head when the crisis comes you must 
give him some training before it comes. 
 
—Seneca, Stoic Philosopher and Imperial Advisor 
 
ABSTRACT 
Judicial ethics rules require criminal court judges to be competent, 
even-tempered, and impartial. In reality, however, many judges are 
grossly ignorant of the law, incredibly hostile toward the defense, and 
outright biased in favor of the state. Such acts of judicial misconduct 
 
† Criminal Defense Lawyer, Cicchini Law Office LLC, Kenosha, Wisconsin. J.D., 
summa cum laude, Marquette University Law School (1999); C.P.A., University 
of Illinois Board of Examiners (1997); M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate 
School (1994); B.S., University of Wisconsin-Parkside (1990). Many thanks to 
Mauricio Hernandez, lawyer and legal blogger, for generously sharing his 
research on judicial misconduct. 
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pose serious problems for the criminal defense lawyer and violate 
many of the defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights. 
This Article presents a framework for the defense lawyer to use in 
combating judicial misconduct. The approach is rooted in a principle 
of Stoic philosophy called “negative visualization.” That is, the lawyer 
should anticipate and visualize judicial incompetence, hostility, and 
bias within the context of the client’s case. This Stoic practice has two 
primary benefits. 
First, by envisioning such problems before they occur, the defense 
lawyer may be able to prevent some of them from happening in the 
first place. Toward that end, this Article identifies several preemptive 
legal strategies to prevent the unethical judge from infecting the 
client’s case. 
Second, envisioning acts of judicial ignorance, hostility, and bias 
before they occur will render them less of a shock when they do occur 
in the middle of trial, in front of the jury, and in a full courtroom. This, 
in turn, allows the defense lawyer to remain calm in the face of 
adversity and formulate an effective response to protect the client. 
Toward that end, this Article identifies several responsive legal 
strategies for the lawyer to use when confronted with judicial 
misconduct in the courtroom. 
The criminal defense lawyer who steps into the courtroom naively 
assuming the trial judge will perform and behave ethically does his or 
her client a tremendous disservice. On the other hand, the defense 
lawyer who anticipates and prepares for judicial incompetence, 
aggression, and bias will be in a better position to protect the 
defendant’s important statutory and constitutional rights. 
  
2019] A STOIC APPROACH 1261 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 
JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1264 
THINK NEGATIVE: LESSONS FROM THE STOICS . . . . . 1270 
EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT . . . . . . . . . . .  1279 
Judicial Incompetence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 
Judicial Hostility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1285 
Judicial Bias (the Prosecutor-in-Chief) . . . . . . . . .  1291 
PREVENTATIVE STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1297 
Substitution of Judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1297 
Motion for Recusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1300 
Motion in Limine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1304 
Trial Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1306 
RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1308 
How Not to Respond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1309 
Objection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1310 
Request for a Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1313 
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1317 
Offer of Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1319 
Closing Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1321 
Appeal and Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1322 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1326 
  
1262 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
INTRODUCTION 
Judicial ethics rules require judges to maintain 
competence in the law, demonstrate the proper judicial 
temperament, and preside over their cases in an impartial 
manner.1 Yet, despite the clarity of these rules, criminal 
court judges violate them with alarming frequency. For 
example, many judges are ignorant of the law and fail to 
grasp even the most basic legal principles that are supposed 
to govern their decisions.2 Other judges are incredibly short-
fused and hot-headed, quick to anger and lash-out at the 
defense lawyer for any or no reason.3 Worst of all, some 
judges, far from being neutral and detached magistrates, are 
outright and unashamedly biased in favor of the state.4 
When judges commit acts of misconduct in criminal 
cases, they create very serious problems for the defense 
lawyer and the defendant. First, defense lawyers are often 
surprised, shocked, and even struck numb by such judicial 
misbehavior, and are therefore unable to effectively respond 
on behalf of their clients.5 Second, the clients need their 
lawyers to effectively respond, as judicial misconduct often 
violates several of the defendant’s important statutory and 
constitutional rights.6 
Given the seriousness of the problem, this Article 
provides a theoretical and practical framework for combating 
judicial misconduct in the courtroom. Part I provides a broad 
overview of the problem and explains why unethical judges 
often target defendants and defense lawyers. Part II then 
explains that, because encountering an ignorant, hostile, or 
biased judge can be an unsettling and even shocking 
 
 1. See infra Part III. 
 2. See infra Section III.A. 
 3. See infra Section III.B. 
 4. See infra Section III.C. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
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experience for the defense lawyer, he or she must learn to 
expect such misconduct before it occurs. This approach is 
rooted in Stoic philosophy, which teaches that “we should be 
anticipating not merely all that commonly happens but all 
that is conceivably capable of happening,” so that we are not 
“overwhelmed and struck numb by rare events as if they 
were unprecedented ones[.]”7 
In order to implement this Stoic practice of “negative 
visualization,” the defense lawyer must know what the ethics 
rules require of judges, how judges commonly break those 
rules, and how such rule-breaking harms the defendant. 
Therefore, Part III sets forth the ethics rules pertaining to 
judicial competence, demeanor, and impartiality. It also 
provides numerous, specific examples of how judges 
commonly break each of those rules, and explains which of 
the defendant’s rights are violated in the process. 
Understanding and anticipating acts of judicial 
misconduct, along with maintaining the proper mindset 
when confronted by an unethical judge, are indeed important 
steps. However, that is only half the battle. In addition, the 
defense lawyer needs to know what can be done, from a legal 
perspective, to protect the defendant. The remainder of this 
Article therefore identifies and discusses several legal 
strategies for dealing with judicial incompetence, hostility, 
and bias. 
In some cases, the defense lawyer may be able to take 
preemptive measures to avoid problems before they 
materialize. Toward that end, Part IV discusses several 
preventative legal strategies: the substitution of judge 
request, the motion to recuse, the motion in limine, and the 
trial brief. The substitution of judge request can prevent all 
forms of anticipated misconduct; the motion to recuse is 
suitable only in cases of previously demonstrated bias; and 
the motion in limine and trial brief are designed to educate 
the judge, thus preventing his or her incompetence from 
 
 7. SENECA, LETTERS FROM A STOIC 179 (Penguin Books 2004). 
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infecting the trial. 
Despite the defense lawyer’s best efforts, however, many 
instances of judicial misconduct are simply unavoidable. 
Therefore, when a judge unexpectedly misbehaves, the 
lawyer must react. Toward that end, Part V discusses several 
legal strategies for responding to an unethical trial judge. 
These include a timely and properly stated objection, the 
request for a curative instruction or mistrial, the offer of 
proof, the closing argument to the jury, and even possible 
post-conviction measures. Most significantly, given the 
difficulty in reacting to certain forms of judicial misconduct 
in front of a jury or a full courtroom, Part V also discusses 
how not to respond to the unethical judge. 
I. JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY 
Judicial ethics rules clearly set forth the basic duties of 
trial court judges. Yet, despite the clarity of the rules, many 
judges break them with alarming frequency and amazing 
creativity. As this Article will demonstrate, “The varieties of 
judicial misbehavior are limited only by the imagination[.]”8 
Law professor and clinic director Abbe Smith describes 
the problem this way: “I like and respect some judges, but 
not as many as I should. . . . Too many are mean-spirited and 
arrogant, going out of their way to insult, ridicule, and 
demean those who come before them.”9 Similarly, Alan 
Dershowitz explains: “I have been more disappointed by 
judges than by any other participants in the criminal justice 
system. . . . Beneath the robes of many judges, I have seen 
corruption, incompetence, bias, laziness, meanness of spirit, 
and plain ordinary stupidity.”10 
 
 8. Charles M. Sevilla, Protecting the Client, the Case and Yourself from an 
Unruly Jurist, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 2004, at 28, 29 (2004). 
 9. Abbe Smith, Judges as Bullies, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253, 253 (2017). 
 10. Alan Dershowitz, THE BEST DEFENSE xvii-iii (Random House 1982); see 
also Dayvid Figler, Who Judges the Judges?, THE NEVADA INDEPENDENT (May 28, 
2019), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/who-judges-the-judges (“Any 
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There are many reasons for judicial misbehavior.11 
Nonetheless, the following two-part explanation usually 
rings true. First, whether strategic or merely habit, we 
lawyers obsessively fawn over judges. We “engage in stylized 
demonstrations of obeisance. We stand when the judge 
enters and leaves the room. Our ‘pleadings’ are ‘respectfully 
submitted.’ Before speaking, we make sure that it ‘pleases 
the court.’ We obey the judge’s orders and we even say ‘thank 
you’ for adverse rulings.”12 And second, from the judge’s 
perspective, “When your daily life consists of sitting in an 
elevated position in judicial robes, with people bowing and 
scraping before you, it likely goes to your head.”13 
When facing discipline for multiple acts of misconduct, 
one rather bold judge even attempted to use his outsized ego 
as a defense. “In an interesting attempt to mitigate his 
discipline,” the judge argued that “his misconduct was 
attributable to a mental disability—narcissistic personality 
disorder (‘NPD’).”14 This is “a condition in which people have 
an inflated sense of self-importance and an extreme 
preoccupation with themselves.”15 Paradoxically, the judge’s 
defense was spot-on but ineffective. Because “NPD was not 
readily treatable,” the disciplinary authority “declined to 
afford it significant mitigating effect.”16 
There is some debate regarding the pervasiveness of 
 
jerk with a law degree can become a judge and as a former judge, I’m living proof. 
There is no guarantee that a person elevated to the bench will be a 
good/wise/thoughtful/tempered judge, no matter his or her predictable 
proclamations to be all those things.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Maxine Goodman, Three Likely Causes of Judicial Misbehavior 
and How These Causes Should Inform Judicial Discipline, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 949 
(2013). 
 12. Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 11, 12 (2001). 
 13. Smith, supra note 9, at 254. 
 14. Douglas R. Richmond, Bullies on the Bench, 72 LA. L. REV. 325, 334 (2012) 
(discussing Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 876 N.E.2d 556 (Ohio 2007)). 
 15. Id. at 334 n.60 (quoting Narcissistic Personality Disorder, PUBMED 
HEALTH (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH001930). 
 16. Id. at 334. 
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judicial misconduct. On the one hand, Judge Carl E. Stewart 
concedes that any particular act of misconduct can have 
serious negative consequences; however, he contends that 
“the overwhelming majority of judges adhere to the highest 
standards of ethical conduct, and that judicial misconduct 
cases do not constitute a systemic crisis for the judiciary.”17 
On the other hand, Smith argues that the problem “is 
more widespread than many people believe—especially 
judges.”18 That is, “When told about the brazenly bad 
behavior of their brethren, judges are often incredulous. How 
quickly they forget their own experience as lawyers. How 
quickly they assume the role of judge and become apologists 
for others.”19 Additionally, most judges are simply out of the 
loop, as they “seldom visit each other’s courtrooms and know 
little of what goes on there.”20 
Although judicial misconduct is now getting some 
national attention,21 it is difficult to quantify the true scope 
of the problem. Cases in which judges commit misconduct 
typically “are not reported to judicial conduct commissions or 
appealed on that basis because the lawyers appear before the 
offending judges with sufficient frequency that they must be 
concerned about possible retribution.”22 Trial lawyers in 
particular “cannot call judges out on their [misconduct] 
without risking reprisal. Many lawyers—especially public 
defenders—are repeat players. Even if indignation is 
 
 17. Hon. Carl E. Stewart, Abuse of Power & Judicial Misconduct: A Reflection 
on Contemporary Ethical Issues Facing Judges, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 464, 465 
(2003). 
 18. Smith, supra note 9, at 255 (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. at 255–56. 
 20. Id. at 256. 
 21. See Wendy Davis, Bullying from the Bench: A Wave of High-Profile Bad 
Behavior has put Scrutiny on Judges, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 1, 2019), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/bullying-from-the-bench (“Across 
the country, judges are creating embarrassing headlines when they are accused 
of abusive behavior toward lawyers and litigants.”). 
 22. Richmond, supra note 14, at 346. 
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warranted in the moment, we have to be mindful of the 
impact on other clients.”23 
Regardless of its true frequency, judicial misconduct 
often violates several of the criminal defendant’s important 
statutory and constitutional rights. This is true even when 
the judge’s misconduct is not directed at the defense in 
particular. For example, when judges fail to act with the 
diligence required by the ethics rules, cases can be delayed 
by months and even years. Meanwhile, indigent defendants 
remain locked-up, often in violation of their statutory and 
constitutional speedy trial rights, while they await trial.24 
The bigger problem, however, is that judicial misconduct 
often is directed at the defense. “Criminal defendants are 
regular targets and so are their lawyers. Getting slapped 
down, dressed down, and put down is part of the job.”25 In 
other words, “Most criminal defense lawyers experience this 
reality not anecdotally but daily.”26 
Defense lawyer Charles Sevilla elaborates: “We are 
targeted because, if we do our jobs, we obstruct the state’s 
case with such incendiary devices as the effective assistance 
of counsel, the presumption of innocence, demanding proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and adherence to rules of 
 
 23. Smith, supra note 9, at 272. It would be nice to think that judges would 
not retaliate against a defense lawyer, as such retaliation ultimately hurts the 
lawyer’s client. However, in some cases, this is hoping for too much. See Davis, 
supra note 21 (discussing one judge’s threat, after learning of a lawyer’s prior 
criticism, that “[w]hat goes around comes around”). 
 24. Judicial laziness violates the ethics rule requiring judges to perform their 
duties diligently. However, this Article focuses on judicial misconduct that causes 
shock, frustration, anger, and embarrassment for the criminal defense lawyer. 
Therefore, while judicial laziness can seriously impact a defendant’s rights, it is 
beyond the scope of this Article. For more on the topic, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad 
Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 440 (2004) (“Whether because of physical or 
emotional problems or simple laziness, [some judges] fail to rule on motions, set 
cases for trial, or issue decisions.”). 
 25. Smith, supra note 9, at 256. 
 26. Id. at 269. 
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procedure.”27 Many judges do not take kindly to such 
advocacy. In fact, if a defense lawyer merely tries “to slow 
things down to have a conversation about the facts or the 
law,” that alone is enough to brand him or her an 
“obstructionist.”28 
Despite the problem that judicial misconduct poses for 
defense lawyers and, consequently, their clients, most 
lawyers fail to give any thought to the matter until it is too 
late. Such passivity does the client a tremendous disservice. 
By failing to anticipate possible judicial misbehavior ahead 
of time, the lawyer has no chance of preventing it from 
happening. Further, in those situations where it cannot be 
prevented, the lawyer will be unprepared to respond to it. 
The unprepared lawyer who is blindsided by judicial 
ignorance, hostility, or bias in the middle of a hearing or trial 
is often shocked, or even struck numb, and cannot effectively 
mitigate the damage and protect the client. 
The impact of judicial misconduct on the defense 
lawyer’s ability to do his or her job should not be 
underestimated. For example, with regard to hostility, “some 
judges are so unpleasant it’s hard to make a cogent argument 
in their presence.”29 In other cases, a bad judicial 
temperament can quickly turn into a direct assault on the 
defense lawyer. Smith describes one explosion on the bench 
that materialized out of nowhere: “I am not sure I have ever 
received such a dressing down by a judge. . . . I have 
repressed the substance of it because it was so shaming. I felt 
about an inch tall.”30 
Even run-of-the-mill judicial incompetence can impact a 
lawyer’s ability to function. Smith recounts a colleague’s 
experience where the judge’s order was so detached from the 
 
 27. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29. 
 28. Davis, supra note 21 (quoting law professor and defense clinic director 
Steve Zeidman). 
 29. Smith, supra note 9, at 263. 
 30. Id. at 265. 
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rule of law that the lawyer was “[s]peechless with surprise.”31 
She then had to “regain[] her equilibrium” before she was 
able to react.32 I can certainly relate to that experience—
although I can’t claim to have always regained my 
equilibrium in time to effectively respond. 
Not surprisingly, less experienced lawyers and their 
clients are at greater risk of harm from judicial ignorance. 
“[Y]oung lawyers expect judges to be like their best, most 
able professors, nimble and knowledgeable. Appearing 
before a judge who is the opposite is a great challenge for 
them.”33 This challenge increases exponentially when the 
judge is not only incompetent, but also has a short fuse or is 
outright biased in favor of the state. 
Unfortunately, most law professors have spent little if 
any time in the courtroom; they are unable even to warn 
their students about this problem, let alone teach them how 
to deal with it.34 Worse yet, some law schools have taken a 
page from the modern university: when students become 
upset or offended by something, administrators validate 
their feelings and may even rush to their aid with “self-care 
activities such as coloring sheets, play dough, positive card-
making, Legos, and bubbles with your fellow law students.”35 
The downside of such coddling, of course, is that when newly 
 
 31. Id. at 267. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 259. 
 34. See Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms of 
American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. 55, 112-13 (2012) 
(explaining that “practical experience often hurts an aspiring professor’s chances 
of being hired” and “the typical new professor possesses only one year of practical 
experience”); Paul Campos, Legal Academia and the Blindness of the Elites, 37 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 179, 180 (2014) (“A 2003 study found that the average 
amount of experience in the practice of law among new hires at top twenty-five 
law schools, among those hires who had any such experience, was 1.4 years.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 35. Greg Piper, UMich law school scrubs Post-Trump Play-Doh and coloring 
event from website, THE COLLEGE FIX (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.thecollegefix 
.com/umich-law-school-scrubs-post-trump-play-doh-coloring-event-website/. 
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minted lawyers find themselves in the crosshairs of an 
unethical judge, toys such as “Play-Doh and coloring books 
won’t be there to comfort them.”36 (Aside from being 
inappropriate for would-be professionals, I can’t imagine how 
such a childish approach could even be effective.) 
Given this, what should the conscientious criminal 
defense lawyer—whether a rookie or battled-tested 
veteran—do about the very real, if not looming, prospect of 
judicial misconduct? This Article offers both a philosophical 
framework and some very specific, practical legal strategies 
for preventing the problem and, when necessary, dealing 
with it after the fact. As the next Part explains, in order to 
effectively manage an unethical judge, the criminal defense 
lawyer must first develop the proper mindset. 
II. THINK NEGATIVE: LESSONS FROM THE STOICS 
As Abbe Smith’s previous examples of judicial hostility 
and incompetence demonstrated, the defense lawyer is often 
caught off guard by acts of judicial misconduct. When the 
lawyer is blindsided this way, negative emotions such as 
shock, frustration, anger, and embarrassment make it 
difficult to formulate an effective and timely response in 
front of a full courtroom or jury. Given the potential for this 
type of negative psychological impact, it is imperative for the 
defense lawyer to develop the proper mindset before even 
stepping foot into the courtroom. 
One way to do this is to draw from the lessons of Stoic 
philosophy.37 Stoicism is concerned with practical wisdom 
rather than linguistics, semantics, and wordplay—topics 
 
 36. Michael D. Cicchini, Law Schools, Lawyers, and Dead Philosophers, WIS. 
L.J. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://wislawjournal.com/2016/12/14/critics-corner-law-
schools-lawyers-and-dead-philosophers/. 
 37. See PETER ADAMSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN WORLDS 
3–9 (2015); Chuck Chakrapani, Stoic Minimalism: Stripping the Dead Bark Off 
Orthodox Stoicism, MODERN STOICISM (Oct. 27, 2018), https://modernstoicism 
.com/stoic-minimalism-stripping-the-dead-bark-off-orthodox-stoicism-by-chuck-
chakrapani/. 
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that occupy the time of the typical philosophy professor.38 
Seneca, who is considered one of the three great Roman 
Stoics,39 explained the difference between the Stoics and 
most other philosophers this way: 
[L]ook at the amount of useless and superfluous matter to be found 
in the philosophers. Even they have descended to the level of 
drawing distinctions between the uses of different syllables and 
discussing the proper meanings of prepositions and conjunctions. 
They . . . know more about devoting care and attention to their 
speech than about devoting such attention to their lives. Listen and 
let me show you the sorry consequences to which subtlety carried 
too far can lead, and what an enemy it is to truth. Protagoras 
declares that it is possible to argue either side of any question with 
equal force, even the question whether or not one can equally argue 
either side of any question! . . . Well, all these theories you should 
just toss on top of that heap of superfluous liberal studies.40 
On the other hand, the practical wisdom in which the 
Stoics were interested centered on “how to live.”41 
Specifically, for our purposes, the Stoics’ primary goal was to 
obtain “freedom from disturbance.”42 This is accomplished by 
preventing, or at least managing, negative emotions such as 
shock, frustration, anger, and embarrassment, as these are 
“the chief threat[s] to our tranquility.”43 
 
 38. See WILLIAM B. IRVINE, A GUIDE TO THE GOOD LIFE: THE ANCIENT ART OF 
STOIC JOY 13 (2009) (“Although modern philosophers tend to spend their days 
debating esoteric topics, the primary goal of most ancient philosophers was to 
help ordinary people live better lives. Stoicism . . . was one of the most popular 
and successful of the ancient schools of philosophy.”). 
 39. ADAMSON, supra note 37, at 81 (Seneca “is the first of three great figures 
to work in the imperial period, known collectively as ‘Roman Stoics’: Seneca, 
Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.”); DONALD ROBERTSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL THERAPY (CBT): STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS RATIONAL AND 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY 262 (2010) (describing Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus 
Aurelius as “philosophical heroes, veritable warriors of the psyche”). 
 40. SENECA, supra note 7, at 160–61. To express Seneca’s thought in modern 
day terms, “Stoic philosophy is too important to be left to academic philosophers.” 
Chakrapani, supra note 37. 
 41. ADAMSON, supra note 37, at 9. 
 42. Id. at 82. 
 43. Id. 
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With this goal in mind, “The Stoics . . . develop[ed] 
techniques for preventing the onset of negative emotions and 
for extinguishing them when attempts at prevention failed.” 
44 For the defense lawyer, these Stoic methods can be used to 
maintain “calm in the face of adversity”45—a disposition that 
is incredibly important when confronted with an ignorant, 
intemperate, or biased judge in a packed courtroom or in 
front of a jury. 
The Stoic technique of greatest value to the defense 
lawyer is what philosopher William Irvine calls “negative 
visualization,” or the practice of envisioning the bad things 
that can happen before they actually happen.46 For our 
purposes, this means anticipating, before the lawyer even 
steps foot into the courtroom, the ways the judge could act 
unethically to the client’s detriment. While this may at first 
seem counterintuitive—why should we spend time thinking 
about bad things that might never happen?—Irvine provides 
two very practical reasons for engaging in this Stoic practice. 
First, by anticipating how the judge is likely to commit 
misconduct, we may be able to “take preventative measures” 
to avoid the problem entirely.47 Second, “no matter how hard 
we try to prevent bad things from happening to us, some will 
happen anyway.”48 In this case, if we are prepared for the 
misconduct before it occurs—even if we cannot predict its 
precise form—we will be better able to react to it.49 
Conversely stated, “Those who are unprepared . . . are panic-
 
 44. IRVINE, supra note 38, at 5. 
 45. ROBERTSON, supra note 39, at 210. 
 46. IRVINE, supra note 38, at 68 (“This technique—let us refer to it as negative 
visualization—was employed by the Stoics at least as far back as Chrysippus. It 
is, I think, the single most valuable technique in the Stoics’ psychological tool 
kit.”). 
 47. Id. at 65. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See ALAIN DE BOTTON, THE CONSOLATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY 81 (Vintage 
Books 2001) (“[W]e best endure those frustrations which we have prepared 
ourselves for.”). 
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stricken by the most insignificant happenings.”50 Our goal is 
to avoid this pitfall and “see to it that nothing takes us by 
surprise.”51 
As though he were writing directly to the modern 
criminal defense lawyer, Seneca described the psychological 
benefits of negative visualization as follows. “A vast variety 
of missiles are launched with us as their target.”52 Given this, 
“If you want a man to keep his head when the crisis comes 
you must give him some training before it comes.”53 He 
offered an illustration using the common crises of his day: 
Rehearse them in your mind: exile, torture, war, shipwreck. . . . 
[W]e should be anticipating not merely all that commonly happens 
but all that is conceivably capable of happening, if we do not want 
to be overwhelmed and struck numb by rare events as if they were 
unprecedented ones[.]54 
And since it is invariably unfamiliarity that makes a thing more 
formidable than it really is, this habit of continual reflection will 
ensure that no form of adversity finds you a complete beginner.55 
How does the lawyer adapt this strategy to modern 
criminal defense practice? He or she simply replaces “exile, 
torture, war, [and] shipwreck” with incidents of judicial 
incompetence, hostility, pro-state bias, and other forms of 
judicial misconduct. Then, the defense lawyer spends a brief 
period of time envisioning and bracing for such conduct, 
within the context of a particular case, before stepping foot 
into the courtroom.56 
Due in part to the coddling approach of modern 
 
 50. SENECA, supra note 7, at 198 (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 67 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. at 179. 
 55. Id. at 198. 
 56. See DE BOTTON, supra note 49, at 91 (“In the early morning, we should 
undertake . . . a meditation in advance, on all the sorrows of mind and body to 
which [Fortune] may subsequently subject us.”). 
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academia, the practice of anticipating negative events will be 
unheard of for many younger attorneys. In addition to having 
to shift gears on a psychological level, young lawyers may 
also face another hurdle in practicing negative visualization: 
a lack of experience. While battle-tested veterans can draw 
directly from experiences in their prior cases when 
envisioning the disasters that await them in court, newer 
lawyers will have to read the written work of others. 
As Charles Sevilla cautions, however, “reading about the 
issue is nothing compared to experiencing the trauma of trial 
before an arbitrary or biased judge.”57 This is where the 
inexperienced lawyer may have to invest some additional 
effort in the practice of negative visualization: 
First, it is not a question of imagining the future as it is likely to 
turn out but to imagine the worst that can happen, even if there’s 
little chance it will turn out that way . . . 
Second, one shouldn’t envisage things as possibly taking place in 
the distant future but as already actual and in the process of taking 
place. For example, imagining not that one might be exiled but 
rather that one is already exiled[.]58 
Once again, the lawyer merely has to replace “exile” with 
incidents of judicial incompetence, hostility, and pro-state 
bias. Within the context of the courtroom, then, “Nothing 
ought to be unexpected by us. Our minds should be sent 
forward in advance to meet all the problems[.]”59 
The Stoic practice of negative visualization can produce 
immediate results, as the next two examples illustrate. To 
begin, in one case I was making an argument at a client’s 
sentencing hearing. During my argument, the judge 
repeatedly interrupted me by yelling—in a packed 
courtroom, no less—that I was a liar. In a case of life 
imitating bad network television, it was like a hostile 
 
 57. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 28. 
 58. ROBERTSON, supra note 39, at 211 (quoting the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault) (emphasis added). 
 59. DE BOTTON, supra note 49, at 88. 
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courtroom scene from one of those cookie-cutter legal dramas 
that litter our airwaves. 
In response to this slander, I tried to explain that I was 
not lying and even provided the source of my information; 
however, my reaction was not calm or particularly effective. 
I’m sure I appeared frustrated, angry, disheveled, and 
frenzied. The reason for my emotional state was that I had 
entered the courtroom naively expecting things to go 
smoothly. Then, I was caught off guard when the judge 
behaved like a belligerent hack. And that was my own fault. 
“If we find ourselves shocked or surprised that a boor 
behaves boorishly, we have only ourselves to blame: We 
should have known better.”60 
By comparison, shortly after that case I appeared in 
front of the same judge for a different client’s sentencing 
hearing. This time I had mentally prepared myself for chaos, 
even though I couldn’t possibly have predicted its precise 
form. My preparation was simple: before court, I merely 
reminded myself that “today I shall meet with people who 
are . . . aggressive, treacherous, malicious, unsocial. All this 
has afflicted them through their ignorance[.]”61 I then 
visualized the judge becoming unhinged and screaming at 
me for no identifiable reason—an easy task, as the judge’s 
previous meltdown was fresh in my mind. I also briefly 
envisioned other forms of misconduct, including judicial 
ignorance of the relevant law—a topic discussed later. 
At this sentencing hearing, I was arguing to the judge 
that my client’s actions, while criminal, did not cause any 
actual harm. The judge went apoplectic, as if I had just 
committed a heinous misstep such as asking for probation 
after a murder conviction. I sat quietly during the judge’s 
outburst—it is important to let the judge get it all out—and 
then calmly stated: “I see I’ve upset the Court. But the level 
 
 60. IRVINE, supra note 38, at 137. 
 61. MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS 10 (Martin Hammond trans., Penguin 
Books 2006). 
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of harm caused by a defendant is an element of this offense, 
and I have to point out mitigating factors. I should probably 
finish my argument, and if it is helpful to the Court, that’s 
great; if not, the Court can disregard it.” 
I also made sure to speak slowly, which not only calms 
the mind but also improves the argument. Seneca’s advice on 
this point is as valuable today as it was when he wrote it to 
a young advocate thousands of years ago: 
One might add, too, that there is not even any pleasure to be found 
in such a noisy promiscuous torrent of words. . . . Even in an 
advocate I should be [loath] to allow such uncontrollable speed in 
delivery, all in an unruly rush; how could a judge (who is not 
uncommonly, too, inexperienced and unqualified) be expected to 
keep up with it? Even on the occasions when an advocate is carried 
away . . . he should not increase his pace and pile on the words 
beyond the capacity of the ear.62 
My experience at the two sentencing hearings, described 
above, also provides evidence for this tenet of Stoicism: “It is 
not events that disturb people”; rather, “it is their 
judgments” about those events that disturb them.63 
In other words, most people tend to describe their emotional 
reactions in broadly stimulus-response (“A causes C”) language: for 
example, he shouted at me (environmental stimulus or “A”) and 
that made me [embarrassed or angry] (emotional response or “C”). 
However, [Albert] Ellis and other cognitive therapists are keen to 
emphasize the intermediate role of . . . cognitions: for example, he 
shouted at me (A), I told myself “That’s awful, I can’t stand it, he’s 
an idiot!” (B), and that made me [embarrassed or angry] (C).64 
To streamline the above concept, and to apply it to my 
experience at the first sentencing hearing described above: 
An external event (the judge screaming at me and calling me 
a liar) caused me to form a judgment about the event (“this 
is awful, I can’t stand it, the judge is an idiot!”) and it was 
 
 62. SENECA, supra note 7, at 84. 
 63. EPICTETUS, DISCOURSES AND SELECTED WRITINGS 223 (Robert Dobbin ed. 
& trans., Penguin Books 2008). 
 64. ROBERTSON, supra note 39, at 114. 
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that judgment that caused my emotional disturbance 
(embarrassment and anger). Put in even clearer terms: 
“Emotional disturbance is the result of mindlessly becoming 
absorbed in external events[.]”65 
My experience at the second sentencing hearing was 
dramatically different, even though I faced the same judge 
and was confronted with the same unprofessional, boorish 
conduct. Because I was expecting hostility at the second 
hearing, I was prepared for it and did not read more into the 
judge’s tantrum than was warranted. I was unfazed by the 
judge’s outburst and remained in complete control of my 
emotional response.66 Maintaining this calm in the face of 
the judge’s attack allowed me to formulate a rational, 
measured legal response. I demonstrated “a temperate, self-
possessed approach to disaster” in the courtroom.67 
It is also important for the defense lawyer to recognize 
and remember that any judge is capable of exploding, or 
committing other forms of misconduct, at any time. This 
includes, of course, the frequent-flyer types who are 
chronically ignorant of the law, perpetually hot-headed, or 
openly biased in favor of the state. Charles Sevilla describes 
this type of nasty, habitual offender as “the 100 percent pure-
beef black-robed jackass, who promises to make life a living 
hell.”68 
 
 65. Id. at 11. 
 66. As explained earlier, preventing or terminating negative emotions is the 
primary goal of Stoicism. Toward this end, another Stoic principle that is of great 
value, especially to the criminal defense lawyer, is the “dichotomy of control.” 
IRVINE, supra note 38, at 85–101. In a nutshell, we must learn “to carefully 
distinguish between our own voluntary judgments and intentions, for which we 
have responsibility, and external events and the actions of others, which lie 
outside of our direct sphere of control.” ROBERTSON, supra note 39, at 61 
(emphasis added). This principle can also be applied to goal setting. For example, 
using the dichotomy of control, we would set only “internal goals” (e.g., to prepare 
well for trial, which is within our control) rather than “external goals” (e.g., to 
win the trial, which is outside of our control or, at best, only partly within our 
control). IRVINE, supra note 38, at 95. 
 67. DE BOTTON, supra note 49, at 78. 
 68. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 28. 
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But not all offending judges fall into this category. 
Equally if not more dangerous, Sevilla warns, is the 
“ordinarily decent judge” who violates his or her ethical 
duties unexpectedly.69 Put another way, a judge’s 
background or personal characteristics cannot be used to 
predict whether he or she will be an ethical judge, an 
occasional ethics rule-breaker, or an ongoing train wreck in 
the courtroom. With regard to judicial hostility, Abbe Smith 
describes the diversity of the offending judges this way: 
Judicial bullies run the gamut. There are smart bullies and stupid 
ones, experienced bullies and novices, bullies that pick on some 
people and parties in particular, and equal opportunity bullies. 
Although in my experience, judicial bullies tend to be more male 
than female, they come in all different shapes, sizes, races, and 
ethnicities. They also come from different practice backgrounds: 
sadly, former defense lawyers can become bullies too[.]70 
Given this, it is important for the criminal defense 
lawyer to practice negative visualization even, and 
especially, when it appears to be unnecessary. Recall the 
Stoic advice to anticipate “the worst that can happen, even if 
there’s little chance it will turn out that way . . . .”71 By 
planning for the worst, we will not be struck numb if a judge 
unexpectedly goes off the rails. And if, on the other hand, 
things go smoothly in court as they sometimes do, we will be 
pleasantly surprised. 
Finally, although a defense lawyer could spend a great 
deal of time implementing negative visualization and other 
Stoic practices,72 such level of commitment is not required to 
reap some of Stoicism’s benefits. Rather, “the power of 
philosophy is such that she helps not only those who devote 
themselves to her but also those who come into contact with 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Smith, supra note 9, at 257. 
 71. ROBERTSON, supra note 39, at 211 (quoting the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault). 
 72. See generally IRVINE, supra note 38 (discussing numerous Stoic practices 
and principles). 
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her.”73 In other words, “continual practice” of Stoicism would 
no doubt be beneficial; however, “the Stoics clearly feel that 
grasping the basic [tenets] of their philosophy in a more 
general sense also has a liberating and therapeutic effect.”74 
III. EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
Regardless of whether we devote significant time or 
minimal time to the Stoic practice of negative visualization, 
we must first learn what, exactly, can go wrong in the 
courtroom. (Without having some idea of the disasters that 
await us, there would be nothing for us to visualize.) 
Therefore, the following Sections discuss a judge’s ethical 
duties of competence, demeanor, and impartiality. Each 
Section provides specific examples of how judges commonly 
violate the rules, and then identifies the defendant’s 
statutory and constitutional rights that are commonly 
impacted by such misconduct. 
The ethics rules cited in this article are from the ABA’s 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.75 However, each state’s 
rules will vary—if not in substantial ways, probably in 
nuance or at least in their organization and structure.76 
Similarly, the defendant’s rights that are impacted by the 
misconduct will also vary by state. This is true not only with 
regard to statutory rights, but even constitutional rights.77 
 
 73. SENECA, supra note 7, at 84. Given his general hostility toward semantics 
and wordplay—the stock-in-trade of most philosophers—Seneca is no doubt 
referring to Stoic philosophy and other Hellenistic philosophies, including 
Epicureanism, which he often quotes and discusses. 
 74. ROBERTSON, supra note 39, at 118. 
 75. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
 76. For example, Wisconsin’s rules were last amended in 1979. See WIS. CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1979), https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/scrule/Display 
Document.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=214570. 
 77. Not only are federal constitutional rights interpreted differently across 
states, but state constitutions can provide more (but not less) protection than the 
U.S. Constitution. For an example in the Fifth Amendment context, compare 
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643–44 (2004) (holding, in a plurality 
decision, that a failure to give Miranda warnings does not require suppression of 
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This Article does not attempt to discuss every judicial 
ethics rule, every way that a judge could violate a given rule, 
or every one of the defendant’s underlying rights that could 
be affected by the judge’s misconduct. This would be 
impractical if not impossible, as “[t]he varieties of judicial 
misbehavior are limited only by the imagination as any 
review of the cases in which judges have been disciplined 
would reveal.”78 Nonetheless, the rule-breaking discussed in 
this Article covers substantial ground, thus providing an 
excellent foundation for the criminal defense lawyer’s 
practice of negative visualization. 
A. Judicial Incompetence 
Just as lawyer ethics rules require lawyers to be 
competent in the law, judicial ethics rules require the same 
of judges. The mandate is simple: “A judge shall perform 
judicial and administrative duties, competently and 
diligently.”79 A comment to the rule elaborates: “Competence 
in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably 
necessary to perform a judge’s responsibilities of judicial 
office.”80 
Maintaining competence in the law entails far less work 
for a judge than for the attorneys, as a judge can simply order 
the prosecutor and defense lawyer to cite legal authority and, 
if necessary, submit briefs on the contested issue. Even 
assuming the judge is starting from a point of complete 
 
the “physical fruit” of the suspect’s statements) with State v. Knapp, 700 N.W.2d 
899, 921 (Wis. 2005) (providing greater protection under the Wisconsin 
Constitution and suppressing physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda 
violation). 
 78. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29. 
 79. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.5(A) (emphasis added). As 
discussed earlier, judicial laziness often violates the ethical duty of diligence and 
often implicates important constitutional rights in the process. Judicial laziness, 
however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 80. Id. cmt. 1 (emphasis added). 
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ignorance, then, he or she merely has to read and apply the 
attorneys’ work product; independent research is usually 
optional. 
Nonetheless, incompetence is probably the most frequent 
judicial ethics violation. As Abbe Smith explains, some 
judges are “bewildered by the most basic procedural and 
evidentiary rules,” and will “say and do idiotic things with no 
awareness of their idiocy.”81 Worse yet, such judges are often 
overconfident in their knowledge, and it is difficult for the 
defense lawyer to correct an “often-wrong-but-never-in-
doubt” jurist.82 
Law students and inexperienced lawyers may find 
Smith’s warning hard to believe, just as I would have when I 
started my criminal defense practice nearly two decades ago. 
At that time, I dismissed the well-intentioned warnings of 
other defense lawyers. I had mistakenly attributed their 
words of caution to what must have been, I thought, their 
own ignorance of the law. It just wasn’t imaginable to me 
that a judge would fail to grasp such basic legal concepts. 
I quickly lost my naiveté, however, as I began to 
experience judicial incompetence firsthand. For example, I 
was once told by a court commissioner that I could not file a 
substitution request against him for a preliminary 
examination, even though the substitution-of-judge statute 
reads: “‘judge’ includes a circuit court commissioner who is 
assigned to conduct the preliminary examination.”83 
(Although there was no excuse for the commissioner’s 
ignorance, much to his credit he stopped yelling, and even 
conceded I was correct, after I showed him the statute.) 
Even more befuddling, when challenging a 
commissioner’s bind-over decision after the preliminary 
hearing in a different case, the trial judge denied my motion 
 
 81. Smith, supra note 9, at 259. 
 82. Id. at 263. 
 83. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.20(3)(a) (West 2019). 
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to dismiss.84 Why? The judge couldn’t formulate an actual 
reason, but predicted with great confidence that “the 
legislature will soon be eliminating preliminary hearings 
anyway”—so much for even the pretense that the rule of law 
matters.85 
The stakes get much higher at trial. I have had judges 
shut me down when cross-examining police officers about 
their shoddy investigation in the case because, the judges 
believed, “the police are not the ones on trial.” These judges 
are blissfully unaware of the defendant’s constitutional right 
to present a defense,86 and counsel’s right (or even duty) “to 
discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to 
charge the defendant[.]”87 
Similarly, in a colleague’s case, I witnessed a judge 
preclude his use of the wrong-person defense at trial unless 
the true perpetrator “marches down to the prosecutor’s office 
and signs an affidavit admitting guilt.” While the test for 
using the wrong-person defense is not the easiest to satisfy, 
the requirement of a sworn confession—something the judge 
articulated with unbelievable confidence—was just a figment 
of a wild judicial imagination.88 
On an even more fundamental level, I have had several 
 
 84. Although a preliminary hearing may be rooted in state statute rather 
than the Constitution, it is considered a “critical stage” of the process at which 
the defendant has the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. See 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
 85. The judge prematurely reached this conclusion based on the legislature’s 
consistent chipping away of defendants’ rights at the preliminary hearing, 
including its elimination of the rule against hearsay. See State v. O’Brien, 850 
N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 2014). However, many years after the judge’s ignorant and 
lawless utterance, the preliminary hearing remains part of the procedural law. 
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.03 (West 2019). 
 86. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 319 (2006). 
 87. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 (1995) (quoting Bowen v. Maynard, 
799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986)). 
 88. See Michael D. Cicchini, An Alternative to the Wrong-Person Defense, 25 
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2013) (discussing the three-part test for 
admissibility of the wrong-person defense). 
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judges try to prevent me from impeaching witnesses with 
their prior inconsistent statements, unless such statements 
were both written and witnessed by a police officer. I have 
explained to judges ad nauseam that it doesn’t matter 
whether the prior statement was made in writing to a police 
officer, typed on “social media,” audio-recorded, video-
recorded, or merely uttered to a drunk on the street. The 
rules of evidence require that I first confront the witness 
with his or her prior statement to “give the witness an 
opportunity to explain or to deny the statement,”89 
regardless of whether it was “written or not.”90 
Even when I have been successful in explaining this rule 
of law, judges never seem to retain the lesson from one trial 
to the next. And when judges limit cross-examination by 
preventing defense lawyers from impeaching witnesses with 
their prior inconsistent statements, they violate not only a 
rule of evidence but also the defendant’s constitutional right 
of confrontation.91 
Judicial incompetence shines brightest when it comes to 
the rule against hearsay, and the published case law is rich 
with examples. In a sexual assault trial, one defendant tried 
to tell the jury what the complaining witness was saying, 
before and during their sexual encounter, to demonstrate 
that he had consent for sexual relations. This defense 
couldn’t have been simpler or clearer. Yet, the judge 
mistakenly believed that such statements by the 
complaining witness were hearsay and excluded them, 
thereby leaving the defense literally defenseless.92 
Similarly, in a bankruptcy fraud case, another defendant 
tried to explain to the jury why he went to the bank to 
 
 89. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.13(2)(a)(1) (West 2019). 
 90. Id. § 906.13(1). 
 91. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 92. State v. Prineas, 809 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that 
such statements are not hearsay and, even if they were, they would have been 
admissible under a hearsay exception). 
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purchase a CD on the day in question, thus demonstrating 
he did not have the requisite intent or knowledge for the 
charged crime. Three times the judge mistakenly ruled that 
such testimony called for hearsay and excluded it.93 Just as 
in the sexual assault case, the judge’s gross 
misunderstanding of the law prevented the defendant from 
ever putting on a defense and, equally important, from 
testifying in his own defense.94 
If one were to set forth all varieties of judicial 
incompetence, one would essentially be writing three full-
length books: one on substantive criminal law, one on 
criminal procedure, and one on the rules of evidence. But 
such grand ambitions have already been achieved, and 
recreating those wheels is not the purpose of this Article. 
Although the above examples address only a few basic laws, 
they are sufficient to hammer home this point: judges 
frequently misunderstand and misapply nearly every rule of 
law—whether substantive, procedural, or evidentiary—no 
matter how important, simple, or clear the rule may be.95 
To conclude this Section, and to hammer home this point 
even more forcefully, law professor Geoffrey P. Miller warns: 
“Bad judges may lack even slight command of the law. 
They . . . misunderstand fundamental rights, rule 
prematurely, and generally display egregious ignorance of 
the rules that supposedly govern their decisions.”96 
 
 93. United States v. Leonard-Allen, 739 F.3d 948, 952–55 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that the out-of-court statements were not offered for their truth, but 
rather to show their effect on the defendant and to explain his thinking and 
actions, and therefore are not hearsay). 
 94. See Timothy P. O’Neill, Vindicating the Defendant’s Constitutional Right 
to Testify at a Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 809, 809 (1990) (“[T]he Supreme Court has directly held that a criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to testify at her trial.”). 
 95. For additional examples of judicial incompetence, see Miller, supra note 
24, at 439–41; Smith, supra note 9, at 257–59. 
 96. Miller, supra note 24, at 439–40. 
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B. Judicial Hostility 
Many judges act as though it is in their job description to 
treat defendants, defense witnesses, and defense lawyers 
with outright hostility. However, the ethics rule clearly 
states: “A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, . . . and others with 
whom the judge deals in an official capacity[.]”97 
When a judge is short-tempered, condescending, or 
critical, such behavior demonstrates, at a minimum, the 
appearance of bias.98 The harmful effects are magnified, of 
course, when the judge misbehaves in front of the jury. “The 
judge’s influence upon [jurors] is of great weight, thus his 
slightest remark or intimation is received with deference and 
may prove controlling. In a criminal trial, a hostile attitude 
toward [the defense] is very apt to influence the jury in 
arriving at its verdict.”99 “Even facial expressions and body 
language can convey . . . an appearance of bias or 
prejudice.”100 Therefore, “A judge must avoid conduct that 
may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.”101 
Acting like a neutral and detached magistrate, especially 
in front of the jury, should be easy for any judge. Unlike the 
prosecutor and defense lawyer who are advocates and are 
trying to win the case, the judge does not have a horse in the 
race. When things get heated in the courtroom, the judge can 
easily rise above the fray, keep calm, maintain order, and 
treat the defendant, his lawyer, and his witnesses with 
 
 97. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
 98. In addition to actual bias, the rules also prohibit the appearance of bias. 
See id. R. 1.2 (prohibiting “the appearance of impropriety”); id. R. 1.2 cmt. 5 
(defining the “appearance of impropriety” as conduct that creates a negative 
perception of the judge’s “impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a 
judge”); id. R. 2.3(B) (“A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by 
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice . . . .”). 
 99. People v. Eckert, 551 N.E.2d 820, 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 100. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 2. 
 101. Id. 
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respect. Yet, despite the clarity of the ethics rule and the ease 
with which it could be followed, judges often throw 
themselves into the fray and go on the offensive. 
For example, when one defense lawyer questioned 
prospective jurors about their ability to be fair and 
impartial—this is, after all, the purpose of voir dire—the 
judge, “without any objection from the prosecutor,” cut off the 
line of questioning.102 He then said to the jurors, “Isn’t that 
one of the biggest insults you have received lately? It is 
improper.”103 The judge made the defense lawyer apologize 
to the jury, and then continued to complain that he, too, was 
offended. The lawyer could only sheepishly conclude voir dire 
by stating, “I apologize to you, too, Judge. I have no further 
questions.”104 In reversing the conviction, the appellate court 
held: 
We find counsel’s attempted inquiry of the jurors neither insulting 
nor improper. Unfortunately, the judge’s interjection conveyed to 
the jury that counsel had done something improper. Forcing him to 
apologize in the presence of the jurors could only have created a 
stigma on defense counsel in the minds of the jurors. . . . These 
unjustified remarks undoubtedly prejudiced defense counsel in the 
eyes of the jury and destroyed the fairness of the trial.105 
Judicial hostility often continues from jury selection into 
opening statements. One defense lawyer learned this when 
the trial judge—again without objection from the 
prosecutor—decided he didn’t like what he heard and took 
aim at the lawyer: “If you do any more of this, I am going to 
find you, in front of this jury, in contempt of the Court. Now, 
stop it right now, and stop it throughout the trial.”106 This 
threat, combined with several other acts of judicial 
misconduct, “painted defense counsel in such a negative light 
 
 102. Brown v. State, 678 So. 2d 910, 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 103. Id. at 912. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 913. 
 106. Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 874 (Md. 1999). 
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that it deprived [the defendant] of a fair trial.”107 
Things can really heat-up once the evidentiary portion of 
the trial begins. When one defense lawyer was cross-
examining a state investigator about his experience with 
false accusations, the judge jumped in: “You are shooting 
goose shot hoping to hit something. . . . You are trying to 
louse up the case, too.”108 
This was a nonsensical criticism, of course, as it is not 
the defense lawyer’s job to help the prosecutor build-up the 
state’s case. Worse yet, when the defense lawyer asked to 
make an offer of proof to justify his line of questioning, the 
judge compounded the problem by childishly proclaiming: 
“You can make anything you want, I can’t hear you.”109 (It is 
even easy to visualize the judge’s cupped hands placed firmly 
around the ears, blocking out the defense lawyer’s voice.) 
In reversing the conviction in the above case, the 
appellate court cited the ethics rule requiring judges to be 
“patient, dignified, and courteous,” and concluded that “[t]he 
trial judge’s remarks not only conveyed an impression to the 
jury that he felt defense counsel was not doing his job 
properly, but also that the defense was wasting the court’s 
time.”110 Further, the judge’s refusal to hear the defense 
lawyer’s offer of proof “denied defense counsel the 
opportunity to present his case effectively.”111 
When it comes to defense witnesses, judges sometimes 
resort to facial expressions and body language to express 
their disagreement, distrust, or outright disgust. Charles 
Sevilla rhetorically asks, “How many times have you seen a 
judge whose attention has been serious, if not laser focused, 
during the prosecution’s case, and then totally disinterested 
 
 107. Id. at 879. 
 108. People v. Eckert, 551 N.E.2d 820, 823 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 824. 
 111. Id. 
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when defense witnesses testify?”112 He offers examples: 
“Perhaps the judge turns his or her chair away from the 
witness, engages in eye-rolling, or talks with the courtroom 
clerk” when defense witnesses are testifying.113 
During my own direct examination of defense witnesses, 
one judge would not only roll his eyes and sigh, but would 
thrash about in the oversized judicial throne so violently that 
I thought his honor might fall out of it. Such behavior “is as 
clear a communication of disbelief as if the judge were orally 
telling the jury to not believe the witness.”114 These “gestures 
and grimaces” create the appearance of bias and “prejudice[] 
the jury against [the defendant], thus depriving him of a fair 
and impartial trial and due process of law.”115 
When it comes to timing, judicial hostility during closing 
argument may be the most harmful of all; this conduct is the 
last thing a jury will see and hear before it begins 
deliberating. For example, one defense lawyer argued in 
closing that the state’s witnesses lied during trial. The judge, 
once again “[w]ithout objection from the prosecutor,” jumped 
in sua sponte to show-off his own unique blend of ignorance 
and hostility. “That is just improper for you to call anybody 
a liar. It’s up to the jury to determine who might be mistaken 
or wrong. . . . There is no evidence that anybody is a liar. . . . 
Do you understand that?”116 Given the power imbalance 
between the two, the defense lawyer sheepishly groveled in 
response, “Yes, Your Honor.”117 
Fortunately, the appellate court didn’t tolerate the 
judge’s behavior. First, “For the trial judge to say in open 
court during final argument that there is no evidence that 
 
 112. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 30. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 879 (Md. 1999). 
 116. Brown v. State, 678 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 117. Id. 
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either witness had lied amounted to the trial judge’s 
assessment of the very issue . . . given to the jury to 
resolve[.]”118 This is highly improper and, by itself, 
warranted a new trial.119 And second, the defense lawyer did 
nothing wrong. “Counsel’s argument in this case was 
manifestly referring to specific testimony given by the 
witnesses so characterized [as liars]. The trial judge was 
wrong to suggest that this argument was improper. . . . 
[C]astigation of counsel impaired the fairness of the trial for 
the defendant.”120 
The above examples demonstrate that judges will attack 
defense lawyers and defense witnesses at all stages of the 
criminal process. But the examples only scratch the surface 
with regard to the types of missiles that judges will launch at 
the defense. Other judges have called the defense lawyer a 
thief,121 a drunk,122 a liar,123 and a clown124—all in front of 
the jury. 
In another case, a judge told the lawyer, “I’m trying to 
find out if you’re the least bit competent to represent anyone 
at any kind of trial.”125 While that particular attack occurred 
at a pretrial hearing, such comments from the bench, even 
 
 118. Id. at 912. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 876 (Md. 1999) (accusing the defense 
lawyer of “attempting to steal a marker from the courtroom”). 
 122. See Earl v. State, 904 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Nev. 1995) (accusing the defense 
lawyer of not knowing “how to practice law” and even suggesting that counsel 
may have been drinking). 
 123. See Spencer v. State, 543 A.2d 851, 854–55 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) 
(accusing the defense lawyer of being “dishonest with the court and the jury”). 
 124. People v. Leggett, 908 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (telling 
defense counsel to “behave like a professional, please and not a clown”). 
 125. Ed Trevelen, Murder Trial Postponed after Judge Removes Defense 
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without a jury present, are still harmful to the attorney-
client relationship and are so shocking and embarrassing 
that they have a tremendous negative impact on the defense 
lawyer’s ability to function. 
Finally, when verbal attacks on defense lawyers aren’t 
quite enough, some judges have resorted to other forms of 
hostility, including having defense attorneys handcuffed in 
the courtroom126 or arrested for contempt in front of the 
jury.127 In many cases, not surprisingly, judges wield their 
contempt powers freely and without even a basic 
understanding of the applicable rules and procedures.128 In 
rare cases, judges may escalate even further. One infamous 
judge resorted to threats of violence, and even actual 
violence, against defense counsel.129 
While all acts of judicial hostility are harmful regardless 
of whether the jury is present, the harm is greatly magnified 
when the jury sees or hears the misconduct. In the broadest 
sense, such misbehavior “lead[s] to an atmosphere resulting 
 
 126. David Ferrara, Las Vegas Judge Handcuffs Public Defender in Courtroom, 
L.V. REV.-J. (May 23, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-
vegas/las-vegas-judge-handcuffs-public-defender-in-courtroom/. The handcuffed 
lawyer later stated, “When I became a public defender, never in a million years 
did I expect I would end up in handcuffs[.]” Davis, supra note 21 (quoting public 
defender Zohra Bakhtary). 
 127. See Sevilla, supra note 8, at 30 (“[A]n unfortunately all too common 
problem is the court’s taking offense at defense counsel during the trial and 
dragging him off in chains.”); Smith, supra note 9, at 260 (“[I]ll-tempered judges 
are quick to hold lawyers in contempt . . . it is not uncommon.”); Miller, supra 
note 24, at 442–43 (“Misuse of the contempt power is common.”); Johnson v. 
State, 722 A.2d 873, 874–75 (Md. 1999) (holding defense counsel in contempt and 
having him arrested in front of the jury multiple times). 
 128. See Gretchen Schuldt, Public Defender’s Office Asks Judge to Vacate 
Contempt Finding against Lawyer, WIS. JUST. INITIATIVE BLOG (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.wjiinc.org/blog/public-defenders-office-asks-judge-to-vacate-
contempt-finding-against-lawyer (denying the attorney “an opportunity to speak 
before having him incarcerated, even though the right to speak before contempt 
sanctions are imposed is well-established in Wisconsin”). 
 129. See Sean Federico-O’Murchu, Florida Judge John C. Murphy Fired for 
“Appalling Behavior”, NBC NEWS (June 3, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/us-news/florida-judge-john-c-murphy-fired-appalling-behavior-n482626. 
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in unacceptable prejudice to a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.”130 
C. Judicial Bias (the Prosecutor-in-Chief) 
As the two previous Sections demonstrated, the 
categories of judicial misconduct often bleed into one 
another. For example, a judge’s ignorance of the law can 
create hostility toward the defense—particularly when 
defense counsel asserts the client’s rights and insists the 
judge follow a law that he or she doesn’t understand. To 
continue with that example, a judge’s hostility toward the 
defense often crosses the line that separates the appearance 
of bias from actual bias. And this leads nicely into our third 
and final category of judicial misconduct: the judge as 
prosecutor-in-chief. 
Judges are required to be neutral and detached 
magistrates; they must not be advocates for the state.131 For 
our purposes, this means two things. First, with regard to 
the judge’s behavior, the judge “shall uphold and apply the 
law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and 
impartially.”132 That is, the judge must not prosecute from 
the bench. And second, in addition to conducting themselves 
appropriately, the judge also “must be objective and open-
minded.”133 That is, the judge must not prejudge the 
defendant or the case. 
 
 130. Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 881 (Md. 1999). 
 131. To the contrary, the law actually requires judges to protect the defendant. 
See Peter A. Joy, A Judge’s Duty to Do Justice: Ensuring the Accused’s Right to 
the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 140 (2017) (“A trial 
judge ‘does not serve his purpose or function by being merely an umpire, a referee, 
a symbol, or an ornament.’”); Patrick S. Metze, Speaking Truth to Power: The 
Obligation of the Courts to Enforce the Right to Counsel at Trial, 45 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 34 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan confirmed a long 
established duty upon the trial court—a duty to the Constitution and a duty to 
the defendant—to protect the defendant and his right to a fair trial.”). 
 132. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (emphasis 
added). 
 133. Id. cmt. 1 (emphasis added). 
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Despite the trial judge’s well-defined role, many jurists 
cannot resist playing the prosecutor-in-chief. Jumping ahead 
to the end of the criminal process, this often occurs during 
sentencing hearings. Instead of listening to what the lawyers 
have to say about the defendant, many judges like to scour 
the internet for evidence. Their goal is to find information 
that the prosecutor may have missed, which can then be used 
to justify a harsher sentence. 
For example, in one case a defense lawyer argued for 
probation as the defendant had no criminal record, had been 
a nurse for eighteen years, served as a U.S. Army reservist 
for four years, and suffered from serious health problems.134 
But instead of listening, the judge was more interested in 
conducting his own internet investigation. He found that, 
contrary to defense counsel’s assertion, the defendant did not 
have a nursing license in Illinois.135 The defendant offered to 
prove that she did, but the judge told her to “close her 
mouth.”136 He added that “your lies are getting you into 
trouble,” and that the defendant was “probably the biggest 
liar that ever came before the court.”137 
The disputed nursing license was significant to the 
judge.138 Consequently—and perhaps unsurprisingly—his 
Honor disregarded the sentencing recommendations of the 
defense and the department of corrections. Although both 
asked for probation,139 the judge sentenced the defendant to 
five years of initial confinement in prison before she could be 
released on extended supervision, which would last another 
six years.140 
 
 134. State v. Enriquez, No. 2015AP1850-CR, 2016 WL 4015230 (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 27, 2016). 
 135. Id. at *8. 
 136. Id. at *2 (internal brackets omitted). 
 137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. See id. at *8. 
 139. Id. at *1. 
 140. Id. at *4. 
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Not only did the judge violate the ethics rules on 
impartiality and objectivity by prosecuting from the bench, 
but he also violated a different ethics rule prohibiting a lesser 
known form of ex parte communications: “A judge shall not 
investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall 
consider only the evidence presented[.]”141 In practice, of 
course, judges routinely violate this rule. Internet sleuthing 
is so common that most defense lawyers I discussed this with 
are surprised to learn that it is even an ethics violation. 
But worse yet, the judge in the above case was 
particularly inept when conducting his independent 
investigation. In determining that the defendant was lying 
about having an Illinois nursing license, the judge 
“apparently limited [his] search to Cook County[,]” a single 
county in that state.142 This explains why his Honor—much 
to his own delight at the time—was unable to verify the 
existence of the defendant’s license. At a subsequent hearing, 
the defendant “produced documentation showing that she 
was licensed in the State of Illinois[,]”143 and the appellate 
court eventually held that the judge violated the defendant’s 
due process rights to a fair sentencing hearing and to be 
sentenced on accurate information.144 
Unlike the proactive, sleuthing jurist discussed above, 
some judges aren’t quite that ambitious. Instead of doing an 
independent online investigation, one judge instead 
complained that prosecutors “aren’t providing [the judge] 
with information that can be used to extend prison 
sentences.”145 This judge—herself a former prosecutor who 
 
 141. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
 142. Enriquez, 2016 WL 4015230, at *8. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at *7. 
 145. Douglass A. Berman, New federal judge in Iowa accused of acting as 
“prosecutor-in-chief at sentencing, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 5, 2013), https:// 
sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2013/06/new-federal-judge-
in-iowa-accused-of-acting-as-prosecutor-in-chief-at-sentencing.html. 
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was unable to abandon the role of advocate upon ascending 
to the bench—even “sent prosecutors an email comparing 
herself to the comic book superhero the Hulk, saying there 
was ‘a lesson’ there for attorneys: ‘You won’t like me when 
I’m angry.’”146 
In addition to demonstrating unbridled arrogance and 
violating the bias-related ethics rules, emailing the 
prosecutors also constitutes the more familiar form of illegal 
ex parte communications. That is, “A judge shall not 
initiate . . . ex parte communications . . . concerning a 
pending or impending matter[.]”147 Or, as the defense lawyer 
in the above matter explained: “Most defendants have a hard 
enough time defending against the prosecuting attorney. . . . 
They at least should expect the judge will not be assuming 
the role of prosecutor-in-chief.”148 
The sentencing hearing is not the only stage where a 
judge might play the role of prosecutor. At the jury trial, the 
opportunities for pro-state advocacy are near limitless. One 
judge, during defense counsel’s cross-examination of a 
witness, told the prosecutor, “I will sustain if I heard [sic] an 
objection,” thus prompting defense counsel to ask, “Judge, do 
we have two prosecutors here?”149 Then, whenever the 
prosecutor declined the invitation to object, the judge would 
simply “sustain objections never made[.]”150 How is that even 
possible from a logistical perspective? In the middle of 
defense counsel’s questions, the judge would simply 
interrupt by blurting out: “Sustained.”151 
Another example of unethical, pro-state advocacy at trial 
is “interrupt[ing] the proceedings to ask [the judge’s] own 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
 148. Berman, supra note 145. 
 149. Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 877 (Md. 1999). 
 150. Id. (internal quote marks omitted). 
 151. Id. at 876. 
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questions and to prevent defense counsel from asking his 
questions.”152 Similarly, in more of a supporting-actor type of 
role, “[T]he judge occasionally instructed the State’s 
Attorney on how to ask proper questions of her witnesses. 
During these incidents, the defense counsel often complained 
about the judge acting as a prosecutor.”153 
Other examples of in-trial misbehavior include propping 
up the credibility of the state’s witnesses154 or criticizing the 
defense’s theory of the case155—all in front of the jury. 
Charles Sevilla explains the general rule in these situations: 
The court cannot, under the guise of the right to comment, use that 
as an opportunity to give a biased view. Thus, the court cannot 
instruct jurors that it believes the defendant is guilty. Any judicial 
comment on the evidence must be accurate, temperate, non-
argumentative, and scrupulously fair. The trial court may not . . . 
usurp the jury’s ultimate fact finding power. In essence, the trial 
judge cannot become an advocate in the guise of commenting on the 
evidence.156 
Finally, in addition to proper judicial behavior, the ethics 
rule cited earlier also requires judges to maintain the proper 
mindset: to be objective and open-minded. Of course, we 
cannot read judges’ minds, but experienced defense lawyers 
believe that judges often form opinions about the defendant’s 
guilt before a verdict is received or a plea is entered. 
Surprisingly, judges sometimes openly express these 
opinions that the law forbids them from even holding. 
One judge, for example, candidly told the jury that “I 
cannot, in honesty, say as I look at [the defendant], that I 
presume him to be innocent.”157 Usually, judges will express 
their belief in the defendant’s guilt in more subtle ways. For 
 
 152. Id. at 877. 
 153. Id. at 877–78. 
 154. See Brown v. State, 678 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 155. See Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 339 (Nev. 1998). 
 156. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157. People v. Conyers, 487 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
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example, when one defense lawyer raised a legal issue for the 
trial judge’s consideration, the judge simply replied: “save 
that . . . for the appeal.”158 However, “This too is misconduct. 
The judge’s expectation of an appeal manifests his belief in 
the certainty of a jury conviction, and this is not a message 
the jury should be receiving.”159 
Prejudgment of a case is not limited to premature 
determinations of guilt; the unethical judge might prejudge 
other issues at other stages of the proceedings. For example, 
before hearing a single word of the attorneys’ arguments or 
the defendant’s allocution at a sentencing hearing, one judge 
“repeatedly told [the defendant] his release to probation was 
‘probably not going to happen.’”160 Similarly, before hearing 
testimony from even a single witness at a restitution 
hearing, another judge told the defense lawyer that “the 
victim’s word ‘is more credible than your client’s words.’”161 
And finally, before a defendant’s probation-extension 
hearing even took place, another judge actually wrote out the 
following prejudgment: “I want his probation extended.”162 
All of the acts and expressions of judicial bias discussed 
in this Section violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. 
In general, Due Process is always implicated. When bias 
manifests at a sentencing hearing it may also implicate, for 
example, the defendant’s right to be sentenced upon accurate 
information.163 When bias manifests before or during trial it 
will also implicate, among other things, “a defendant’s right 
to be tried by an impartial judge[.]”164 
 
 158. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 30. 
 159. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 160. State v. Lamb, No. 2017AP1430-CR, 2018 WL 4619535, at *4 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sept. 25, 2018). 
 161. State v. Driver, No. 2018AP870-CR, 2019 WL 1921458, at *1 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Feb. 26, 2019). 
 162. State v. Gudgeon, 720 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
 163. See State v. Tiepelman, 717 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2006). 
 164. Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2005); see also 
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IV. PREVENTATIVE STRATEGIES 
The previous Part set forth numerous examples of 
judicial incompetence, hostility, and bias. With an 
understanding of how judges commit such misconduct, the 
criminal defense lawyer is able to anticipate and brace for 
such acts. That is, the defense lawyer is now able to 
implement the Stoic practice of negative visualization. 
Within the context of any given case, the lawyer can imagine 
the judge being ignorant of the rules and procedures on 
which the case will turn; hostile to the defense for no reason 
other than the defense lawyer doing his or her job; and biased 
in favor of the state. 
But once the lawyer visualizes some of the disastrous 
things that could happen in the courtroom, what’s next? As 
discussed earlier, the practice of negative visualization 
produces at least two benefits. The first is that, in some 
cases, the defense lawyer may be able to take preventative 
measures to avoid disaster before it even materializes. 
Toward that end, four such preventative strategies are 
discussed in the Sections below. 
A. Substitution of Judge 
If the defense lawyer is somewhat experienced and 
familiar with the assigned judge, counsel may, after 
considering the facts of the case and the anticipated legal 
issues, decide to file a substitution of judge request.165 Also 
known as a “peremptory challenge,” some states permit the 
defense to file such a request even without “an allegation of 
 
Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 882 (Md. 1999) (discussing the defendant’s right 
“to a fair and impartial trial”). 
 165. It is not clear, at least to me, whether the decision to substitute judges is 
the client’s or the attorney’s. I always discuss the issue with the client and make 
a recommendation, but then leave the decision whether to substitute to him or 
her. Sometimes, particularly when the client has a criminal history in the county, 
he or she may have a strong opinion on the matter; more commonly, however, 
they defer to my recommendation. 
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cause.”166 That is, the defense may be able to obtain a new 
judge, as a matter of right, for any reason or no reason. 
This is a highly state-specific law. One state’s 
substitution statute reads: “In any criminal action, the 
defendant has a right to only one substitution of a judge[.]”167 
Provided the request is timely, the defendant may substitute 
against the commissioner assigned to the preliminary 
hearing or against the judge to which the case is assigned 
following bind-over.168 
Exercising this right does not mean the defendant gets 
to choose his or her judge.169 And even where the state 
legislature has granted this peremptory right, judges often 
devise ways to deter defendants from exercising it. For 
example, there may be an “unspoken policy,” or sometimes a 
spoken but unwritten policy, “to assign parties who 
peremptorily challenge a judge to a like-minded jurist—out 
of the judicial frying pan and once more into the . . . fire.”170 
Substituting against the assigned judge can be an 
effective strategy for preventing all three forms of judicial 
misconduct discussed in this Article: incompetence, hostility, 
and outright, pro-state bias. For example, I often have cases 
where there is a significant amount of defense evidence that 
I anticipate introducing at trial. Such evidence may take the 
form of presenting “other acts” against the complaining 
witness, exposing a shoddy police investigation, or cross-
examining state witnesses about their pending cases or 
probationary status in order to expose their motive to divert 
blame away from themselves and toward the defendant. 
Some judges, however, may not understand the legal 
 
 166. Miller, supra note 24, at 479–80. 
 167. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.20(2) (West 2019). 
 168. See id. § 971.20(3)(a). 
 169. In some cases, the court system may name in advance the judge to whom 
the case will be assigned, or there may be only two judges in the county to begin 
with. In these situations, the defendant does, in a sense, get to pick the judge. 
 170. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29. 
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principles that govern the use of such evidence at trial 
(incompetence) or, even if they do understand them, are 
unlikely to let the defense present such evidence (general 
pro-state bias). Therefore, if my case is assigned to such a 
judge, I will consider filing a substitution of judge request to 
prevent getting shutdown in the middle of trial. In doing so, 
I can avoid that problem entirely. 
However, in addition to the risk of getting an assigned 
judge who is essentially the equivalent of, or worse than, the 
substituted judge, there are at least two other risks to 
consider before using this substitution of judge strategy. 
First, if counsel decides to substitute against a judge 
because of the judge’s hostility or bias, there is the risk the 
judge may retaliate in other cases. “No doubt, the exercise of 
such challenges to the judicial bully will provoke only more 
bullying.”171 And some judges aren’t shy about it. In a 
California case, for example, one judge “was removed in part 
for his vehement criticism of public defenders for exercising 
such challenges.”172 
Second, if defense counsel requests a substitution of a 
judge because of the judge’s ignorance of the law, it then 
follows (somewhat ironically) that the judge could reject the 
request because of the very same ignorance that counsel is 
attempting to escape by filing the request in the first place. 
To illustrate this conundrum, consider a case where the 
defendant filed a timely substitution request.173 Because the 
judge failed to understand the statute, he went on to preside 
over the defendant’s trial, sentence him after conviction, and 
(unsurprisingly) deny his post-conviction motions.174 
Fortunately, although it took nearly five years from the day 
the defendant first requested the substitution, the case was 
 
 171. Id. at 29 n.5. 
 172. Id. (citing McCartney v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 
512, 531–32 (1974)). 
 173. State v. Harrison, 858 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Wis. 2015). 
 174. Id. at 375. 
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eventually reversed and remanded for a new trial in front of 
a different judge—the very thing the statute requires.175 
B. Motion for Recusal 
Even if the opportunity to file a substitution of judge 
request has passed, the defense lawyer may still have ways 
of removing a judge who appears hell-bent on hanging the 
defendant—either figuratively or literally.176 “If during the 
course of pre-trial litigation, judicial bias appears, one can 
try to disqualify the judge by timely use of a challenge for 
cause.”177 
In some sense, this motion for recusal is a reactive, 
rather than preventative, strategy, in that it is used in 
response to actual evidence of bias. Further, if the judge’s 
bias surfaces during trial and the defense makes a motion to 
recuse at that time, then this strategy would definitely be 
considered reactive and should be included in the next Part 
(on responsive strategies) instead of in this Part (on 
preventative strategies). 
However, the motion to recuse is in some ways similar to 
the request for a substitution of judge. When a motion to 
recuse is filed early in the criminal process, it is designed to 
prevent further problems and is therefore rightly considered 
a preventative measure. But regardless of its classification, 
the motion to recuse is not appropriate for all forms of 
judicial misconduct; its use is much more limited than the 
statutory substitution of judge that was discussed in the 
previous Section. More specifically: 
Recusal . . . [is] not available to challenge a judge on grounds that 
she is incompetent or dilatory. Nor will [recusal] provide a basis for 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Interestingly and surprisingly, three states still allow for hanging as a 
method of execution, though it is not their primary modus operandi. Methods of 
Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-
execution?scid=8&amp;did=245 (last visited May 4, 2019). 
 177. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29 (emphasis added). 
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removing a judge who is waspish or ill-tempered, so long as the 
abuse is dispensed on an evenhanded basis. [Recusal] offer[s] little 
help for litigants before judges who display poor judgment or 
inappropriate behaviors.178 
Rather, the form of misconduct to which a motion for 
recusal is best suited is judicial bias. Bias can surface in 
unexpected ways during the course of a case. Defense counsel 
must be alert, otherwise he or she could later be blamed for 
failing to identify the problem and raise the issue. For 
example, I once represented a client in a codefendant case. 
The codefendant was convicted at her own jury trial, well 
before my client ever had her day in court. In preparing for 
my client’s trial, I read the transcript from the codefendant’s 
sentencing hearing to see if the prosecutor was advancing 
inconsistent theories of the case depending on which 
defendant was in the state’s crosshairs at any given time. 
While I didn’t find what I was looking for, I did find that, 
when sentencing the codefendant, the judge had condemned 
my client, by name, as the more culpable person in the 
alleged crime—even though my client was not present to 
defend herself at the codefendant’s trial. The judge also said 
that the complaining witness was honest and trustworthy—
a rather alarming declaration, as this judge would soon be 
deciding my pretrial motion to allow me to impeach that 
same witness, at my client’s trial, with numerous prior 
criminal convictions involving dishonesty and numerous 
other instances of untruthfulness. 
Despite forming and then publicly expressing these 
views about my client and her case, the judge had every 
intention of presiding over my client’s trial. And the judge 
probably would have done so had I not filed the following six-
point motion to recuse.179 
 
 178. Miller, supra note 24, at 461. 
 179. I discuss this case and reproduce the relevant part of the motion (with 
minor modifications) after full compliance with even the State Bar of Wisconsin’s 
onerous, anti-lawyer interpretation of ethics rule 1.9 on the duty of 
confidentiality to former clients. That is, I have obtained written consent from 
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1. Every defendant is entitled to an unbiased tribunal. “A biased 
tribunal . . . constitutes a structural error.” State v. Gudgeon, 720 
N.W.2d 114, 119 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). “Since biases may distort 
judgment, impartial decision-makers are needed to ensure both 
sound fact-finding and rational decision-making as well as to ensure 
public confidence in the decision-making process.” Id. Bias can take 
the form of “subjective bias” or “objective bias.” Id. at 121. Objective 
bias, in turn, can take the form of either “actual bias” or “the 
appearance of partiality.” Id. 
2. “[A] judge who has prejudged the facts or the law cannot decide a 
case consistent with due process[.]” Id. at 122. In our case, as 
demonstrated below, the Court has, while presiding over the 
codefendant’s case, prejudged my client’s case (actual bias) and 
expressed its views in a way that an “ordinary reasonable person 
would discern a great risk that the trial court in this case had 
already made up its mind (the appearance of partiality).” Id. at 123. 
3. More specifically, when sentencing the codefendant, the Court 
made the following statements about the facts of the case and about 
the guilt of my client, who had not been tried and was not present 
to defend herself: “And you bring [name of my client] along . . . So 
you and [name of my client] had a plot and it was evil and it was 
horrifying . . . And you were just as much a part of it as [name of my 
client] who apparently is quite a dangerous person.” 
4. The Court not only prejudged my client’s guilt, but also concluded 
that she was more culpable than the codefendant who had been 
tried and convicted and was being sentenced. The Court stated to 
the codefendant: “That you would . . . do this kind of a thing and go 
along with [name of my client]. Does she have some hold over 
you? . . . You’re a much better person than this. . . . I hope you have 
changed and I hope you know better than to . . . hang around with 
people that might convince you that you ought to [commit this type 
of crime].” 
5. The Court has also prejudged the facts of our case by determining 
that the complaining witness was being truthful in his accusations 
against my client. More specifically: The Court stated that the 
complaining witness “seemed like a very decent guy. . . . He wasn’t 
 
the client to reproduce this information. Further, although not necessary in this 
particular case, I have also removed the client’s name. For more on the trap 
awaiting unsuspecting attorneys who discuss the public aspects of their closed 
cases, see Michael D. Cicchini, On the Absurdity of Model Rule 1.9, 40 VT. L. REV. 
69, 69 (2015). For more on my (ultimately failed) efforts to change this ethics rule 
in the state of Wisconsin, see Michael D. Cicchini, Changing Rule 1.9, THE LEGAL 
WATCHDOG (Dec. 3, 2015, 2:24 PM), http://thelegalwatchdog.blogspot.com/ 
2015/12/changing-rule-19.html. 
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no [sic] liar. He wasn’t a nasty person. He was a really decent 
person. He spoke well. He presented himself well. And you and 
[name of my client] make a plot[.]” 
6. This prejudgment is problematic, as my client intends to 
demonstrate at trial, through counsel, that the complaining witness 
is, in fact, a liar. He has not only committed crimes of dishonesty 
but has, in the recent past, made false statements to the police and 
to his probation agent. This evidence is admissible pursuant to Sec. 
906.08 (2), Wis. Stats. 
Filing a motion for recusal, however, is “a high-risk 
strategy” for both the client and the lawyer.180 “There is 
always a risk that the judge will resent having [his or] her 
impartiality questioned. If the judge does take umbrage and 
refuses to recuse, the party who sought [recusal] may face 
hostility for the remainder of the trial.”181 
But when I showed my client what I had read in the 
codefendant’s sentencing transcript, the client 
understandably did not want to be tried by a judge who had 
prejudged her guilt, viewed her as the leader of the criminal 
enterprise, anointed the complaining witness as the victim, 
and even praised that witness’s credibility—all before the 
client had ever set foot into the courtroom. Despite the risks, 
I had no choice but to file the motion. Fortunately, and much 
to the judge’s credit, the motion was immediately granted. 
Whether a lawyer who obtains recusal will face 
retaliation down the road in future cases is, I suppose, 
anyone’s guess and certainly depends on the judge being 
recused.182 However, my own intuition is that most judges 
would not retaliate in this way given that a different, real-
life defendant would suffer the resulting harm. But 
regardless, this is just one of the risks a defense lawyer must 
take when zealously advocating for a client. 
 
 180. Miller, supra note 24, at 462. 
 181. Id. at 461–62. 
 182. See Smith, supra note 9, at 272 (“Trial lawyers cannot call judges out . . . 
without risking reprisal.”); see also infra Section V.G (discussing reporting 
judicial misconduct and the risk of retaliation in future cases). 
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C. Motion in Limine 
Some judges won’t understand the legal issues likely to 
arise in a given trial. However, many of these judges are at 
least willing to try to apply the law. In these cases, counsel 
can prevent the negative impact of judicial incompetence by 
educating the trial judge on the legal issues through a motion 
in limine. 
A motion in limine is a pretrial motion seeking an 
advanced ruling on the admission of evidence or on some 
other issue likely to arise at the trial.183 Case law, statutory 
law, judicial scheduling orders, local rules, or local custom 
may even require a motion in limine, or other form of pretrial 
motion, before certain evidence or defenses can be used at 
trial.184 But even when a pretrial motion is purely optional, 
filing it will give the judge the opportunity to (hopefully) read 
and calmly reflect on the matter, rather than being forced 
into a snap decision in the middle of trial on an issue that is 
completely foreign to him or her. 
By way of example, the following motion in limine is 
designed to educate the judge about, and get an advance 
ruling on, the defendant’s cross-examination of a state’s 
witness. In this situation, the witness, who was on probation, 
was initially under investigation for the crime. However, the 
witness diverted blame to the defendant, thus leading to the 
state’s decision to charge the defendant instead of the 
witness. Cross-examination to expose possible biases is fair 
game. 
 
 183. See Frank D. Celebrezze, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Quelling the Tide of 
Improper Comment to the Jury, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 237, 245 (1987) (discussing 
defense counsel’s use of a motion in limine to prevent anticipated prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing arguments); see also State v. English-Lancaster, 642 
N.W.2d 627 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the benefits and increased use of 
motions in limine). 
 184. The law varies greatly by state, but examples where pretrial notice or a 
motion might be required by statute could include the defendant’s use of an alibi 
defense or the introduction of evidence that may fall within a so-called rape-
shield statute. 
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1. The defendant moves the Court to permit defense counsel to 
question the state’s witnesses about their probationary status (or 
extended supervision status) at the time of the alleged crime and/or 
at the time of their in-court testimony. More specifically: 
a. “[T]he Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a 
criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution 
witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias deriving 
from the witness’s probationary status[.]” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 
308, 309 (1974). See also Sec. 906.16, Wis. Stats. 
b. In Davis, Mr. Green was a witness for the state. “At the time of 
the trial and at the time of the events Green testified to, Green was 
on probation[.]” Id. at 311-12. The trial court, however, prevented 
defense counsel from cross-examining Green on his probationary 
status. Id. at 313-14. The United States Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction, holding: 
i. “The accuracy and truthfulness of Green’s testimony were key 
elements in the State’s case against [the defendant]. The claim of 
bias which the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a 
basis for an inference of undue pressure because of Green’s 
vulnerable status as a probationer, as well as of Green’s possible 
concern that he might be a suspect in the investigation.” Id. at 318-
19. 
ii. Had the defendant been allowed to “introduce evidence of Green’s 
probation for the purpose of suggesting that Green was biased,” 
then “serious damage to the strength of the state’s case would have 
been a real possibility.” Id. at 319. 
c. Finally, a witness’s probationary status can be proved by extrinsic 
evidence. As Davis establishes, probationary status goes to a 
witness’s bias. Consequently, extrinsic evidence is admissible. That 
is, “The bias or prejudice of a witness is not a collateral issue and 
extrinsic evidence may be used to prove that a witness has a motive 
to testify falsely.” State v. Williamson, 84 Wis. 2d 370, 383 (1978). 
While the motion in limine might cure judicial ignorance, 
its primary disadvantage is that it puts the prosecutor on 
notice of the defense’s trial strategy. Therefore, in cases 
where a pretrial motion is not legally required for the 
introduction of the defendant’s evidence (or the exclusion of 
the state’s evidence or the resolution of some other legal 
issue), counsel may instead wish to consider a different 
means of educating the judge: the trial brief. 
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D. Trial Brief 
The trial brief is a very short memo on the legal issue the 
judge is likely to misunderstand or, perhaps, has never even 
heard of before. Because the brief will be used in the middle 
of trial, it should ideally be a single page in order to increase 
the chance the judge will read it. Toward that end, it should 
also have some eye-catching formatting, if possible. This may 
strike the conscientious defense lawyer as superficial; 
however, it is important to remember that the reason for 
drafting the trial brief in the first place is to educate a judge 
who has no knowledge of—and, therefore, probably little or 
no interest in—the applicable law. 
The trial brief is a preventative measure in the sense 
that the lawyer anticipates problems and drafts the brief 
before trial. However, it is reactive in the sense that, in order 
to avoid alerting the prosecutor to the defense’s strategy, it 
is not used until mid-trial, after the issue first arises. 
To demonstrate, I will revisit the example in the previous 
Section: cross-examining the state’s witness about his 
probationary status. Continuing with that theme, defense 
counsel may also wish to cross-examine the investigating 
officer about his willingness to blindly accept the witness’s 
story instead of thoroughly investigating the case. Just as 
some judges are unaware that a witness’s probationary 
status could be evidence of his motive to shift blame to the 
defendant, some judges are also blissfully unaware of the 
defendant’s right to challenge the quality of the police 
investigation. 
In this situation, rather than filing a motion in limine 
which will tip off the prosecutor about the defendant’s 
strategy, defense counsel may consider drafting a trial brief 
on the matter. The brief can then be used, at trial, if the 
prosecutor objects to this line of questioning or if the judge 
shuts it down sua sponte. Below is an excerpt of a trial brief 
on the defendant’s right to expose the poor quality of law 
enforcement’s investigation and the wisdom of the 
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prosecutor’s charging decision. 
At trial, the defense is permitted to “discredit the caliber of the 
investigation or the decision to charge the defendant.” Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 (1995). Citing Kyles, state law 
specifically holds that the defendant is “entitled to challenge the 
reliability of the police investigation and to challenge the credibility 
of [the government agents].” State v. DelReal, 225 Wis. 2d 565, 571 
(Ct. App. 1999). This “common trial tactic of defense lawyers” 
(Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446) is accomplished in numerous ways, 
including: 
 “[D]iscrediting of the police methods employed in assembling 
the case.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446. 
 Attacking “the thoroughness and even the good faith of the 
investigation, as well.” Id. at 445. 
 Arguing that “the police had been guilty of negligence.” Id. at 
447. 
 Throwing “the reliability of the investigation into doubt” and 
“sully[ing] the credibility of [the lead] Detective.” Id. 
 Launching “an attack on the integrity of the investigation.” Id. 
 Demonstrating “that the investigation was limited by the 
police’s uncritical readiness to accept the story and 
suggestions of [a witness] whose accounts were inconsistent to 
the point.” Id. at 453. 
Further, when state investigators were aware of statements made 
by others, such statements, when explored by the defense during 
cross-examination of the investigators, are not hearsay. Rather, 
they are admissible to attack the quality of the investigation, even 
if the defense chooses not to call the persons who made the 
statements to the witness stand. 
For example, in Kyles, a person named “Beanie” made several 
statements to the police. The state failed to disclose these 
statements, and the Court reversed the conviction, stating: “Even if 
Kyles’s lawyer had followed the more conservative course of leaving 
Beanie off the stand, though, the defense could have examined the 
police to good effect on their knowledge of Beanie’s statements and 
so have attacked the reliability of the investigation in failing to even 
consider” the possibility that the defendant was innocent. Id. at 446 
(emphasis added). 
In the event the judge is unaware of the law and shuts 
down defense counsel’s cross-examination at trial, 
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submitting the above trial brief has an additional advantage: 
if the judge still refuses to permit the line of questioning, the 
trial brief can serve as a supplement to the defense lawyer’s 
offer of proof. Then, if the defendant is convicted and later 
appeals, the trial brief can also be helpful to the appellate 
lawyer and may strengthen the basis for the appeal. 
While the above preventative strategies can be very 
effective in some cases, in most cases the judge’s misconduct 
falls well outside the defense lawyer’s control. That is, 
despite the best laid plans and preemptive measures, the 
judge’s incompetence, hostility, and bias simply cannot be 
prevented. In these situations where prevention is not 
possible, the defense lawyer must react or respond to judicial 
misconduct. 
V. RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES 
The second benefit of the Stoic practice of negative 
visualization—that is, envisioning acts of judicial 
incompetence, hostility, and bias in the context of a 
particular case before such events unfold—is that defense 
counsel will not be struck numb, panic-stricken, or even 
mildly surprised when the judge botches the law, becomes 
unhinged, or acts as a second prosecutor in the courtroom. 
But while maintaining calm in the face of courtroom 
adversity is a necessary step in effectively responding to 
judicial misconduct, it is not, in itself, sufficient. The lawyer 
also needs to have a plan for what, specifically, to say or do 
when faced with acts of judicial ignorance, hostility, or pro-
state bias. 
While it is not possible to develop a response for every 
possible act of misconduct, the defense lawyer can develop 
strategies based on the general type of judicial misbehavior. 
Several possible responsive strategies are discussed below. 
First and most significantly, however, the defense lawyer 
must learn how not to respond. 
 
2019] A STOIC APPROACH 1309 
A. How Not to Respond 
I don’t know if defense lawyer Charles Sevilla is a Stoic. 
But even if he isn’t, he provides excellent Stoic-like advice 
about what not to do when faced with a bully on the bench: 
“One thing is clear. If the judge is acting like an ass toward 
the client or defense counsel, it does no good to engage the 
court with in-kind retorts. That only provokes predictable 
responses none of which will be helpful in front of a jury.”185 
An example of the toe-to-toe exchange Sevilla warns 
against can be found in a case cited previously, where the 
trial quickly devolved into a verbal slugfest between the 
defense lawyer and the judge.186 By any objective account, 
the defense lawyer held his own when exchanging barbs with 
the unethical jurist. This includes asking the judge, “You 
want to take over the case? If you try the case for me . . . you 
will lose it,” and “Can I hold you in contempt of Court?”187 
The problem, however, is that such a competition does 
not occur on a level playing field. The jury sees the judge 
wearing a flowing robe and sitting in an elevated position in 
the courtroom, all the while looking down upon the mere 
mortals who bow and scrape. Jurors will naturally think the 
judge must be the smartest person in the room. For this 
reason, at least from the jury’s perspective, the defense 
lawyer is unlikely to win an exchange of barbs—no matter 
how sharp and timely the lawyer’s delivery. 
Given this, the defense lawyer must, above all, rise above 
the fray, maintain a calm and professional demeanor, and 
avoid returning the judge’s insults in tit-for-tat fashion. As 
the Sections below illustrate, however, this does not mean 




 185. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29 (emphasis added). 
 186. Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 874–77 (Md. 1999). 
 187. Id. at 876 (emphasis added). 
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B. Objection 
In his article, Charles Sevilla identifies numerous 
categories of judicial misconduct, and then states that “[t]he 
suggested remedy for most of them is a specifically stated 
objection” followed by “a request for a curative instruction, 
and/or a mistrial.”188 
It is unfair to burden defense counsel with having to 
monitor and correct the trial judge—that is, to referee the 
referee. On top of that, doing the judge’s job for him carries 
a real risk for the defendant. Defense lawyers “are, 
understandably, loath to challenge the propriety of a trial 
judge’s utterances, for fear of antagonizing him and thereby 
prejudicing a client’s case.”189 Nonetheless, despite the 
unfair burden on the defense lawyer and the risk to the 
defendant, Sevilla is generally correct. The widely-accepted 
rule is that defense counsel’s “failure to object or assign 
misconduct will generally preclude review by [the appellate] 
court.”190 
Put another way, “It will be a rare case where the failure 
to object . . . is excused.”191 This means that, even in cases 
where the appellate court is willing to review acts of judicial 
misconduct despite counsel’s failure to object at trial,192 it 
will be defense counsel, not the judge, who is on the hook for 
 
 188. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29. 
 189. Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 338 (Nev. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29 n.8 (citing State v. Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233 
(Iowa 1976), as a rare case where the defense lawyer’s failure to object was 
excused). 
 192. Appellate courts aren’t always willing to do this. Many will go to great 
lengths to blame defense counsel in order to protect judges from their own 
misconduct. One way to do this is to hold that counsel’s failure to object precludes 
appellate review entirely. See, e.g., Admin, SCOW to decide if failing to object to 
consideration of information at sentencing forfeits right to review, ON POINT (May 
15, 2019), at http://www.wisconsinappeals.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsin-state-
public-defender/scow-to-decide-if-failing-to-object-to-consideration-of-
information-at-sentencing-forfeits-right-to-review/. 
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the judge’s misconduct via an ineffective assistance of 
counsel (IAC) claim.193 
For example, in one case of extreme judicial ignorance, 
the judge refused to let a young witness for the defense 
testify because, the judge claimed, the defense lawyer failed 
to establish the witness’s competence to testify.194 The law, 
however, clearly stated that the burden falls to the party 
objecting to the testimony to establish the witness’s 
incompetence.195 Yet, even though it is the judge’s duty to 
know how to run a courtroom, the appellate court actually 
blamed defense counsel “for the failure to correct the judge’s 
mistake”; the court then reversed the conviction not for 
judicial error, but because counsel was ineffective for failing 
to teach the trial judge how to do his job.196 
Even in cases where the appellate court doesn’t try to 
hold the defense lawyer accountable for the judge’s 
misconduct, counsel’s failure to object could still harm the 
defendant on appeal. The reason is that, when there is no 
objection, the appellate court may analyze the judge’s 
misdeeds under the difficult-to-satisfy “plain error doctrine,” 
which often results in the appellate court forgiving the trial 
judge’s misconduct and affirming the conviction.197 
 
 193. See Jon M. Woodruff, Plain Error by Another Name: Are Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims a Suitable Alternative to Plain Error Review in 
Iowa?, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1811, 1835 (2017) (blaming the defense lawyer for failing 
to correct the trial judge’s errors has made “defense counsel the ultimate 
gatekeeper of all error at the trial level”). 
 194. Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 195. Id. at 613. 
 196. Id. at 644 (emphasis added). 
 197. Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 338 (Nev. 1998). Oade is actually a rare case 
where the court reversed for judicial misconduct under the plain error doctrine. 
The court did this, in part, because the defense lawyer, “early in the trial, moved 
for a mistrial based on the court’s ‘attitude’” and was denied. Id. Therefore, the 
defense lawyer wasn’t required to continue to lodge repeated, fruitless objections. 
Some states’ plain error tests could, at least in theory, be more difficult for a 
defendant to satisfy than the IAC test. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 119 
F.3d 1006, 1014 (1st Cir. 1997) (At least with regard to prosecutorial misconduct, 
“Plain error review is ordinarily limited to ‘blockbusters’ and does not ‘consider 
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Sevilla also advises that counsel must be clear about 
what he or she is objecting to, and must also state the legal 
authorities on which the objection is based. “Whenever 
making an objection to judicial misconduct, it cannot be 
emphasized enough that the objection must be stated for the 
record, and it must be based on a denial of the Fifth and/or 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to a fair and 
impartial tribunal.”198 
Further, as many of the examples in this Article 
demonstrate, judicial misconduct often impacts other rights 
as well. For example, when the judge cuts off defense 
counsel’s cross-examination of a police officer under the false 
theory that “the police are not on trial,” the judge also 
violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation and to present a defense. Therefore, in cases 
where the judge’s misconduct impacts multiple 
constitutional (and even statutory) rights, counsel should 
state as many bases as possible for his or her objection. 
It is also important to remember this: one possible 
response to judicial misconduct is to do nothing. This is a 
judgment call for the defense lawyer and, in some cases, it is 
the right call. For example, I was once trying a case in front 
of a judge who had a decent grasp of the rules of evidence and 
was giving the defense a fair trial. Things were going well 
until, without any objection from the prosecutor, the judge 
unexpectedly sniped at me and cut off my line of questioning 
of a key witness. Because I had, to some extent, already made 
my point with the witness, I decided to move on without 
objecting. 
Things went well from that point forward, including the 
jury’s favorable verdict. In hindsight, my decision not to 
object to the single instance of relatively mild judicial 
misconduct turned out to be the correct one—or, even if 
 
the ordinary backfires—whether or not harmful to a litigant’s cause—which may 
mar a trial record.’”). 
 198. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29. 
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incorrect, a harmless one. But if I had lost the trial, and the 
defendant’s appellate lawyer raised the issue of judicial 
misconduct, the claim likely would have been filtered 
through the IAC framework. That is, I would have been 
blamed for failing to correct the judge’s behavior on the spot 
and in the middle of trial. 
When the defense lawyer decides not to object to an 
initial act of judicial misconduct, it is important not to 
become desensitized to subsequent transgressions. As the 
acts of misconduct start to accumulate, counsel may wish to 
change course and object. In addition to stating the bases for 
the objection, counsel may also want to refer to the prior 
instances where no objection was raised. This will establish, 
for the appellate record, the serious and cumulative nature 
of the judge’s misbehavior. 
Finally, not only do objections carry the risk of offending 
an already incompetent, hostile, or biased trial judge, but 
objecting (in and of itself) will at best put an end to the 
misconduct. An objection does nothing to cure the harm that 
the judge has already caused. This means that the defense 
lawyer may also wish to request a remedy along with lodging 
the objection. 
C. Request for a Remedy 
As discussed above, in a mild, isolated case of judicial 
misconduct, the defense lawyer may simply decide to ignore 
it to avoid drawing further attention to the judge’s remarks 
or behavior. In other cases, defense counsel may want to 
object in order to terminate the misconduct and (hopefully) 
prevent future incidents of it. However, in many cases, 
counsel may wish to follow-up his or her timely, specific, and 
supported objection with a request for a remedy. The two 
most common remedies for judicial misconduct are the 
curative instruction and the mistrial.199 
 
 199. See id. 
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A curative instruction may be a sufficient remedy in 
many cases. When a judge slips into the role of prosecutor-
in-chief and vouches for a state witness, a curative 
instruction may solve that problem. Even when a judge 
disparages the defense lawyer in front of the jury, a curative 
instruction may fix that damage as well. However, as with 
jury instructions in general, the devil is in the details. The 
effectiveness of the curative instruction depends on the 
words used to compose it. 
For example, one judge vouched for a state witness by 
telling the jury “she is going to be telling the truth” and 
“[t]here is no question about that.”200 However, the appellate 
court held the judge’s curative instruction to be adequate, 
thus rendering the earlier vouching harmless: 
The judge later explained to the jury that what he “meant to say by 
that statement was that the witness would be sworn under oath and 
would be sworn to tell the truth, as all the witnesses would. But as 
to whether or not, in fact, you want to believe that testimony, it is 
up to you to decide. You make the determination as regarding the 
credibility of any witness that testifies.”201 
But judges often have difficulty issuing a proper curative 
instruction, particularly when one is needed, essentially, to 
apologize to the defense lawyer (rather than merely to 
correct a judicial misstatement). For example, after 
disparaging defense counsel and even ordering “the sheriff to 
take a hold of him” in front of the jury, one judge attempted 
to give a curative instruction for his own misbehavior.202 
“During that instruction, however, the trial judge told the 
jury that his own behavior was ‘because the defendant’s 
lawyer was about ten miles out of limit.’”203 Such language 
did nothing to fix the problem. Instead, it disparaged the 
 
 200. Pertgen v. State, 774 P.2d 429, 431 (Nev. 1989). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 879 (Md. 1999) (discussing Suggs v. State, 
589 A.2d 551 (Md. 1991)). 
 203. Id. 
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defense lawyer a second time, thus repeating the very 
misconduct the instruction was supposed to cure. The judge’s 
instruction therefore exacerbated, rather than mitigated, the 
harm.204 
But even good curative instructions may not work. 
Regardless of how well they are drafted, they have inherent 
limits. “[J]uries are highly sensitive to every utterance by the 
trial judge, the trial arbiter, and . . . some comments may be 
so highly prejudicial that even a strong admonition by the 
judge to the jury . . . will not cure the error.”205 This problem 
is compounded when the judge commits multiple acts of 
misconduct. Therefore, in these severe cases, defense counsel 
may wish to request the remedy of a mistrial. 
A mistrial request raises several complicated issues. 
First, the general rule is that when the defense requests the 
mistrial and the judge grants it, the prosecutor can simply 
retry the defendant.206 However, even in these situations, 
retrial may be barred in some circumstances. One state’s test 
reads that “if [a] defendant’s motion for mistrial is prompted 
by prosecutorial or judicial misconduct which was intended 
‘to provoke’ defendant’s motion[,]” then retrial is barred.207 
When requesting a mistrial, then, counsel should indicate 
that the request was provoked by the judge’s misconduct. 
This will be an easier case to make, of course, when the judge 
demonstrated bias (as opposed to incompetence or even 
general hostility), or when the judge misbehaved repeatedly 
(as opposed to committing a single transgression). 
Preventing the state from retrying the defendant will 
likely be an uphill battle. Assuming the defense lawyer’s 
request for a mistrial is granted, counsel will likely have to 
move for the judge’s recusal (assuming the judge 
 
 204. See id. 
 205. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29 (quoting Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 
976, 983 (5th Cir. 1968)). 
 206. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673–75 (1982). 
 207. State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 114, 122 (Wis. 1980) (emphasis added). 
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demonstrated bias) and then file a motion with the newly 
assigned judge to bar retrial, based on the original judge’s 
intent to provoke the mistrial request. The odds of a new trial 
judge finding that a colleague intended to provoke the 
mistrial request, thus barring retrial, are probably very low. 
Another question with regard to mistrials is: Who 
decides to make the request, the defense lawyer or the 
defendant? Even some courts don’t know. One appellate 
court opined that it was “an intriguing and sophisticated” 
question as to whether defense counsel or the defendant 
“should be permitted to make a mistrial decision” in the 
context of prosecutorial misconduct.208 Some of the 
complications are as follows: 
[E]ven if the mistrial decision is, in theory, left to the lawyer, it is 
often—probably always—intertwined with decisions that are left to 
the defendant. For example, the defendant has the constitutional 
right to counsel of choice. But what if the defendant could not afford 
to pay his lawyer for a second trial and would instead have to obtain 
state- or court-appointed counsel for the retrial? In that case, 
wouldn’t a mistrial request implicate a constitutional right? And 
shouldn’t the decision whether to ask for a mistrial be left to the 
defendant? 
Similarly, many defendants are unable to post bail and therefore 
must remain incarcerated during their cases—a key reason that a 
defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. But what if, 
due to court congestion, unavailable witnesses, or some other 
reason, a mistrial would result in a long delay? In that case, 
wouldn’t a mistrial request implicate yet another constitutional 
right? And, once again, shouldn’t the decision whether to ask for a 
mistrial be left to the defendant?209 
Given these complications—along with the general 
awkwardness of calling a judge incompetent, intemperate, or 
outright biased to his or her face—this much is obvious: It is 
 
 208. State v. Washington, 419 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
 209. Michael D. Cicchini, Combating Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing 
Arguments, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 887, 928–29 (2018) (discussing a mistrial request in 
the context of prosecutorial misconduct and citing State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 
114, 123 (Wis. 1980) (defendant has a “‘valued right’ to secure a verdict from the 
first tribunal”)). 
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not easy for the criminal defense lawyer to make an 
objection, instantly articulate the bases for that objection, 
and then request the appropriate remedy on the spot, in the 
middle of the jury trial. Therefore, the following Section will 
discuss the matter of timing with regard to objections and 
requests for remedies. 
D. Timing 
Because state law varies dramatically, it is difficult to 
develop an effective, one-size-fits-all plan for the timing of 
objections and the request for remedies. Therefore, the 
following outline provides only a general framework that 
should be modified based on several factors, including (most 
significantly) the applicable state procedure.210 
First, before trial, the defense lawyer should briefly 
discuss with the defendant the possibility of judicial 
misconduct, the effect it could have on the jury, and the 
potential remedies for the various forms of misconduct. With 
regard to the possibility of a mistrial motion at trial, 
“[D]efense counsel should explain the possibility—or 
likelihood—of retrial as well as other consequences including 
a lengthy delay, continued incarceration, additional 
attorney’s fees and other trial expenses, and, most 
significantly, the possibility of the state developing a 
stronger case for the second trial.”211 Discussing these 
matters with the client before trial will make any in-trial 
discussions more efficient and productive, and any in-trial 
decisions will be easier to make. 
Second, at trial, many forms of judicial misconduct will 
require an objection (as opposed to an offer of proof, which is 
discussed in the next Section). For example, suppose the trial 
 
 210. Some states have bizarre and illogical requirements governing the timing 
and order of the requested remedies. See Cicchini, supra note 209, at 919–20 
(discussing the timing and possible waiver of remedies in the context of 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 211. Id. at 927. 
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judge disparages the defense lawyer in front of the jury by 
questioning his competence or calling him a liar. It is well-
settled that “[i]t is completely improper for a judge to advise 
the jury of negative personal views concerning the 
competence, honesty, or ethics of attorneys in a trial.”212 
Given this, defense counsel might respond to the judge’s 
remarks as follows: “I object to the court’s comments and 
request a sidebar to state the basis for my objection and to 
request a remedy.” At the sidebar, counsel might elaborate 
as follows: 
I objected because the court’s comments about me in front of the 
jury were highly improper and violated the defendant’s due process 
rights, including the right to a fair trial before an impartial judge 
and jury. The court’s comments from the bench expressed a 
negative opinion of me, demonstrated judicial bias, and infected the 
jurors.213 I ask the court to issue a curative instruction indicating 
that the remarks were improper and should be disregarded.214 
Then, it is critical to make a record of the substance of 
the sidebar at the first opportunity outside of the jury’s 
presence. Alternatively, if the court denies the request for a 
sidebar, counsel may then want to make the same record, 
stated above, in front of the jury. If counsel decides not to do 
so, he or she should revisit the issue at the first opportunity 
outside the jury’s presence. At that point, counsel should say 
that he or she was unable to elaborate earlier, as the judge 
had refused to hold a sidebar. 
Third, if the court overruled the objection, refused to give 
 
 212. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 29 (quoting People v. Fatone, 165 Cal. App. 3d 
1164, 1174–75 (1985)). 
 213. Sevilla suggests that, as a basis for an objection to judicial statements 
constituting bias (as opposed to attacks on defense counsel), counsel may state: 
“I object. The court appears to have left its role as a neutral and detached 
magistrate and has taken up the role of the prosecutorial partisan.” Id. at 30. 
 214. Sevilla suggests that, to cure judicial statements constituting bias (as 
opposed to attacks on defense counsel), the instruction may conclude: “[I]t has 
been pointed out to me that some of my words and actions could be misconstrued 
as biased, and if you have taken them that way, I apologize because in no way 
should that influence your judgment.” Id. at 32. 
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a curative instruction, gave a poorly-worded instruction, or 
engaged in subsequent acts of misconduct after giving the 
instruction, counsel will want to remind the client of the 
mistrial option. For numerous reasons identified earlier, the 
defense lawyer and the defendant should, ideally, agree on 
whether to request a mistrial. When requesting this remedy, 
counsel might make a record as follows: 
The defense requests a mistrial. I previously objected to the court’s 
disparaging comments about me in the jury’s presence. Such 
commentary is highly improper and violates the defendant’s due 
process rights, including the right to a fair trial with an unbiased 
judge and jury. However, [the court overruled the objection] or [the 
court refused to issue a curative instruction] or [the court’s curative 
instruction was insufficient] and/or [the court continued to engage 
in similar misconduct]. Therefore, the court’s conduct has provoked 
me to move for a mistrial. 
Fourth, if the court overruled the defense lawyer’s 
objection, or denied earlier requests for a remedy, counsel 
may wish to renew the objection and the requests during the 
jury instruction conference or even later, once the jury begins 
deliberating. In some jurisdictions this is possible and even 
desirable, as counsel may be permitted to move for a mistrial 
late in the proceedings, as long as the motion is made before 
“the jury returns its judgment.”215 
E. Offer of Proof 
While most acts of judicial misconduct require the 
defense lawyer to object, others require counsel to make an 
offer of proof. Suppose that during the defense lawyer’s cross-
examination of an investigating officer, the court cuts off 
questioning because of the now-familiar judicial 
misconception that “the police are not the ones on trial.” In 
this situation, “Just as the objection is the key to saving for 
review any error in admitting evidence, the offer of proof is 
 
 215. State v. Rockette, 718 N.W.2d 269, 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing 
mistrial requests in the context of prosecutor misconduct). 
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the key to saving error in excluding evidence.”216 Counsel 
should therefore ask to make an offer of proof, or simply 
make one without permission. Such a request or offer should 
literally include the words “offer of proof” to highlight the 
matter for possible appeal, and might take the following 
form: 
I make the following offer of proof in response to the [state’s 
objection] or [the court’s action or ruling]. Cross-examination of this 
witness regarding his investigation of the case is not only proper 
but required. The defendant has constitutional rights of 
confrontation, to present a complete defense, and to the effective 
assistance of counsel. These rights require that I explore the 
thoroughness of the police investigation and the state’s decision to 
charge the defendant. In this case, my areas of inquiry would 
include [identify specific topics or questions].217 
If the defense lawyer has prepared a trial brief on this 
issue—a strategy discussed in Section IV.C—counsel should 
simultaneously reference that document and submit it as a 
supplement to the offer of proof. Legally, the court must let 
the defense lawyer make this record. “It is a well settled rule 
of law that it is error for the trial court to refuse to permit 
counsel to make an offer of proof.”218 Without such an offer, 
it would be impossible for the court to “make an informed 
decision as to admissibility” of the evidence.219 If the court 
refuses to listen, counsel should state that “I have to protect 
the record and make an offer of proof. [It is] a matter of right 
for this defendant to make an offer of proof in this case.”220 If 
that fails, counsel should consider submitting a written offer 
of proof, at the earliest opportunity, that covers both the facts 
and the law. 
 
 216. People v. Eckert, 551 N.E.2d 820, 825 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990). 
 217. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 (1995) (explaining that a “common 
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 218. Eckert, 551 N.E.2d at 825. 
 219. Id. 
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F. Closing Argument 
In a very creative response to judicial hostility or 
outright bias, Charles Sevilla recommends that if the judge 
committed severe or multiple transgressions during the trial, 
the defense lawyer should address the issue directly in 
closing argument.221 Sevilla’s strategy is based upon the 
standard, pattern instruction that is given in many 
jurisdictions warning jurors not to be influenced by judicial 
bias. One such instruction from the bench reads as follows: 
If any member of the jury has an impression of my opinion as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, disregard that 
impression entirely and decide the issues of fact solely as you view 
the evidence. You, the jury, are the sole judges of the facts, and the 
court is the judge of the law only.222 
The following closing argument of defense counsel is 
designed to draw the jury’s attention to, and even reinforce, 
the above instruction: 
The court [has instructed you] that nothing in its conduct or 
comments during the trial are to be deemed an alignment [of] the 
court with either side. Now, given what has transpired during the 
trial, you may find that hard to follow. You have seen and heard the 
judge not only rule against me, but do so using very harsh terms. . . . 
I ask that you heed the instruction and not be influenced by the 
court’s conduct toward me. My client deserves a fair trial by fair 
jurors in front of a fair judge, and because you are the ultimate 
decision-makers, into your able hands falls the final burden of 
fairness. I ask that if you have perceived a bias on the part of the 
judge that you not let it influence you in any way.223 
Sevilla’s strategy of addressing the jury directly in 
closing argument might be effective and, in cases where 
other remedies were denied or have failed, even necessary. 
Further, it is arguably a legally proper strategy based upon 
the following two-part theory. 
First, the defense can (and necessarily must) deliver a 
 
 221. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 32. 
 222. WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTION No. 100 (UNIV. OF WIS. 2000). 
 223. Sevilla, supra note 8, at 32. 
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closing argument centered on other jury instructions issued 
by the court. Common examples include arguing that the 
state failed to establish an element of the crime (substantive 
instruction),224 the state failed to prove the case beyond a 
reasonable doubt (burden of proof instruction),225 the state’s 
witnesses are biased and should not be believed (credibility 
of witness instruction),226 the state’s other-acts evidence 
must not be used to conclude the defendant is a bad person 
and therefore is guilty (cautionary instruction),227 the jury 
must begin by presuming the defendant is innocent 
(presumption of innocence instruction),228 the prosecutor 
failed to produce evidence to support his opening statement 
(instruction that opening statements are not evidence),229 
and so on. 
Second, although the judge might not enjoy listening to 
the defense lawyer’s closing argument criticizing the judge’s 
words or conduct at trial, such an argument is legally proper. 
It is based on a jury instruction (warning the jury to 
disregard its impression of the judge’s personal views) that 
the court itself has just read. 
G. Appeal and Report 
Even if defense (trial) counsel does not practice appellate 
law, counsel may still have continuing obligations to advise 
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the client of his or her appellate rights. This obligation may 
even extend to filing the necessary paperwork to preserve 
those rights.230 In addition to possibly obtaining a reversal of 
the conviction, of course, the virtues of basing an appeal on 
judicial misconduct include the following: 
The right of appeal can correct some of the mistakes of bad judges 
and acts as a deterrent against judges making improper rulings in 
the first place. Appeals can have the additional virtue of generating 
a public decision by the appellate tribunal that can embarrass a bad 
judge and bring public attention to his or her deficiencies, as well 
as warning other judges of the fate that awaits them if they make 
similar mistakes. Appeals also preserve judicial independence 
because the correction of error occurs within the judicial branch.231 
When discussing appellate rights with the client, defense 
(trial) counsel should be sure to discuss all known appellate 
issues, including instances of judicial misconduct. One 
criminal-defense practice aid also recommends that counsel 
set forth the possible bases for appeal in a letter to the public 
defender’s appellate division or the client’s privately-
retained appellate lawyer. “[T]he trial attorney’s evaluation 
of the potential grounds for appeal, although not binding, is 
always an invaluable aid to the appellate attorney.”232 
In addition to protecting the client’s appellate rights and 
even identifying incidents of judicial misconduct for the 
appeal, defense counsel should also consider reporting the 
trial judge’s acts of misconduct to the state’s judicial ethics 
board. Abbe Smith writes: 
Rule 8.3(b) of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, on maintaining the integrity of the profession 
and reporting misconduct, requires “[a] lawyer who knows that a 
judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial 
conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge’s fitness 
for office shall inform the appropriate authority.” The comment to 
Rule 8.3 notes that self-regulation of the legal profession includes 
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initiating a disciplinary investigation when a lawyer encounters 
misconduct by judges as well as lawyers. The comment further 
notes that lawyers should report even an “apparently isolated 
violation,” as this might “indicate a pattern of misconduct that only 
a disciplinary investigation can uncover.”233 
Reporting ethics violations is a grossly underutilized 
mechanism for punishing and deterring judicial misconduct. 
In the entire state of California in 2014, for example, only 43 
judges were reprimanded for misconduct.234 In reality, 
however, “[J]udges disparage lawyers and litigants much 
more than the number of disciplinary cases would 
suggest.”235 
There are two things that deter lawyers and others from 
reporting judicial misconduct. First, as discussed earlier in 
the context of recusal motions, “Trial lawyers cannot call 
judges out on their bullying without risking reprisal.”236 And 
second, other than trial lawyers, “few people know there is 
even a mechanism for filing complaints” against unethical 
judges.237 
The first problem could be avoided, and the second 
problem could be solved, if defense attorneys simply notified 
their clients of the client’s right to report judicial misconduct 
in their cases. Attorneys could do this at the same time they 
 
 233. Smith, supra note 9, at 272 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
8.3(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)). 
 234. Maura Dolan, 43 California judges were reprimanded for misconduct last 
year, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015, 7:37 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local 
/california/la-me-judges-discipline-20150404-story.html. 
 235. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Wisconsin’s numbers are similarly 
low. See WIS. JUDICIAL COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2018) (“In 2018, the 
Judicial Commission received 408 initial inquiries from which it evaluated 31 
new RFI files. The Commission authorized eleven new investigations in 2018.”). 
Further, with regard to RFIs, “[T]he Commission may dismiss the matter with a 
communication of the Commission’s concern or a warning, cautioning the judge 
or court commissioner not to engage in specified behavior. Such an expression of 
concern or warning is not discipline.” Id. at 6. In fact, in 2018, the Commission 
appears to have filed only two complaints. Id. 
 236. Smith, supra note 9, at 272. 
 237. Dolan, supra note 234. 
2019] A STOIC APPROACH 1325 
advise their clients about their right to appeal their 
conviction. 
To continue with the California example, the 
Commission on Judicial Performance has a very helpful 
website that provides a link to the complaint form and even 
gives examples of the types of misconduct that can be 
reported.238 These include “improper demeanor, failure to 
disqualify when the law requires, receipt of information 
about a case outside the presence of one party, abuse of 
contempt or sanctions, and delay in decision-making.”239 The 
website also offers helpful information for properly 
completing the complaint form: 
A complaint should not simply state conclusions, such as “the judge 
was rude” or “the judge was biased.” Instead, the complaint should 
fully describe what the judicial officer did and said. If a court 
document or an audio or video tape evidences the misconduct, you 
may submit a copy (do not send original documents) or mention it 
in your complaint.240 
Defense counsel’s letter to the client’s appellate 
attorney—which would outline the acts of judicial 
misconduct that could serve as the bases for an appeal—can 
also be of great help to the client when completing the 
complaint form and lodging a formal ethics complaint 
against the judge. 
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CONCLUSION 
Judicial misconduct in the courtroom—which frequently 
takes the form of incompetence, hostility, or bias—poses 
serious problems for the criminal defense lawyer and, 
consequently, for the defendant.241 This Article offers the 
criminal defense lawyer a framework for dealing with 
unethical trial court judges. 
To begin, the lawyer should implement a fundamental 
practice of Stoic philosophy and anticipate acts of judicial 
misconduct within the context of his or her cases.242 Toward 
that end, this Article has identified three relevant judicial 
ethics rules, provided specific examples of how judges break 
those rules, and described many of the defendant’s statutory 
and constitutional rights that are violated in the process.243 
This Stoic practice of anticipating negative events—
known as “negative visualization”—produces at least two 
benefits.244 One is that it allows the lawyer to take 
preemptive measures to avoid or prevent misconduct before 
the judge has the chance to commit it.245 For example, the 
substitution of judge request allows the defense to avoid all 
three forms of judicial misconduct by simply obtaining a new 
judge as a matter of right. The motion to recuse can prevent 
a biased judge from continuing to preside over the case. And 
the motion in limine and trial brief can educate the 
incompetent judge, thus preventing his or her ignorance of 
the law from infecting the client’s trial. 
The other benefit of negative visualization is that, by 
bracing the defense lawyer for the acts of judicial 
incompetence, hostility, and bias that await him or her, it 
allows the lawyer to maintain “a temperate, self-possessed 
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approach to disaster” in the courtroom.246 With that state of 
mental calm, the lawyer can more effectively react to an 
unethical judge.247 Reactive strategies include the objection, 
the request for a remedy, the offer of proof, a specially-
tailored closing argument, the appeal of a conviction, and the 
reporting of the misconduct to the appropriate ethics 
commission. 
In sum, when a criminal defense lawyer naively steps 
into the courtroom assuming the trial judge will behave 
ethically, the lawyer does his or her client a tremendous 
disservice. On the other hand, when the lawyer anticipates 
acts of judicial incompetence, hostility, and bias—even when 
he or she cannot predict their precise form—the lawyer will 
be better able to prevent, or at least react to, judicial 
misconduct. This, in turn, will go a long way toward ensuring 
the defendant’s right to due process and to be tried by a 
competent, temperate, and impartial judge. 
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